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HARROWING THROUGH NARROW
TAILORING: VOLUNTARY RACE-CONSCIOUS
STUDENT-ASSIGNMENT PLANS,
PARENTS INVOLVED AND FISHER
Joseph O. Oluwole* and Preston C. Green III **
Introduction
A coup de grace is in progress against voluntary race-conscious measures,
despite the fact that these race-conscious measures—designed to realize and
increase student body diversity—create many social and educational benefits.
This coup de grace is stealthily executed through the narrow tailoring prong of
strict scrutiny review. Research reveals the many benefits of diversity that would
be at risk if voluntary race-conscious measures can no longer be implement. For
instance, a meta-analysis of 515 studies shows that interracial prejudice diminishes
with intergroup racial contact.1 Furthermore, 553 social scientists note that
student learning in racially diverse classrooms decreases stereotyping and fosters
critical thinking, as well as higher academic achievement.2 Other benefits of a
racially diverse education include less residential segregation, higher income for

* Joseph O. Oluwole, J.D., Ph.D., is an attorney-at-law and an Associate Professor of
Education and Law at Montclair State University.
** Preston C. Green III, J.D., Ph.D., is a John and Carla Klein Professor of Urban Education,
Professor of Educational Leadership and Law at the University of Connecticut.
We would like to extend our deep appreciation to Michael J. Fitzgerald, Editor-in-Chief of
the Wyoming Law Review, Article Editors Rebecca J. Zisch, Arah N. Shumway, and Katie J. Koski
as well as Managing Editor Grant R. Smith for their invaluable help with this article. Our sincere
thanks to each journal editor and staff who worked on this publication.
1
Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory,
90 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol., 751–83 (2005).

Civil Rights Project, PICS: Statement Of American Social Scientists Of Research On
School Desegregation Submitted To US Supreme Court, Oct. 10, 2006: 5–8.
2
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minorities, greater civic engagement, increased parental involvement, and better
student preparation for a diverse workforce.3
Given the many benefits of cross-racial interactions, over the years, various
schools have implemented race-conscious admissions plans.4 Nonetheless, schools’
voluntary efforts ensuring racial diversity are under constitutional attack.5 These
attacks—designed to end race-conscious measures—continue despite research
showing that 74% of black students and 80% of Latino students nationwide
attend schools where they have limited opportunities to interact with white
students because minorities are the majority at their schools.6 Gary Orfield, John
Kucsera, and Genevieve Siegel-Hawley of the UCLA Civil Rights Project, report
that Latino students have increasingly less exposure to white students in all Western
states.7 In California, for example, the “average Latino student had 54.5% white
peers in 1970 but only 16.5% in 2009.”8 In the Northeast, the average black
student attends school with only 25% white peers.9 In the South, “[f ]or the last
four decades, contact between black and white students has declined in virtually
all Southern states.”10 Nationwide, the average white student attends school with
75% white peers.11
The Civil Rights Project attributes these trends to the withdrawal of
judicial support for using race in admissions decisions.12 Since Brown v. Board
3

Id. at 5–10.

See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007);
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp.2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009). See Parents Involved, 551
U.S. at 818 (observing that a federal district court found that Jefferson County Public Schools
“treated the ideal of an integrated system as much more than a legal obligation—they consider it a
positive, desirable policy and an essential element of any well-rounded public school education.”).
4

5
As used in this article, the term “diversity” encompasses the educational benefits of diversity.
The educational benefits of diversity include decreased racial stereotyping, higher academic
achievement, parental involvement, interracial contact, cross-racial understanding, enlightening
class discussions, and better preparation to participate in an increasingly diverse work force.

Gary Orfield, John Kucsera & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, E Pluribus . . . Separation:
Deepening Double Segregation for More Students, Civil Rights Project at UCLA (2012),
available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/
mlk-national/e-pluribus...separation-deepening-double-segregation-for-more-students/orfield_
ePluribus_executive_2012.pdf.
6

7

Id. at 1010.

8

Id.

9

Id.

Genevieve Siegel-Hawley & Erica Frankenberg, Southern Slippage: Growing School Segre
gation in the Most Desegregated Region of the Country, Civil Rights Project at UCLA, 4442
(2012), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-anddiversity/mlk-national/southern-slippage-growing-school-segregation-in-the-most-desegregatedregion-of-the-country/hawley_MLK_South_executive_2012.pdf.
10

11

See Orfield, Kucsera & Siegel-Hawley, supra note 6, at 4.

12

Orfield, Kucsera & Siegel-Hawley, supra note 6, at 1.
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of Education, there has been a “roll back” of several educational racial diversity
gains.13 Most troubling in this area is the United States Supreme Court’s coup
de grace against voluntary race-conscious measures through the narrow tailoring
prong of the Equal Protection Clause’s strict scrutiny standard.14 While the Court
accepts diversity as a compelling interest ever since Justice Powell’s Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke 15 opinion, the Court’s recent race-conscious
school-admissions cases quickly temper any excitement regarding diversity as a
compelling interest given the harsh reality of the Court’s narrow tailoring hurdle.16
In other words, the Court is harrowing race-conscious measures through its narrow
tailoring analysis. To explore this development, we examine the Supreme Court’s
latest K–12 and higher education race-conscious student-admissions decisions in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 17 and Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin.18
First, this article outlines the strict scrutiny standard used in reviewing
Equal Protection Clause racial classification cases.19 Second, the article presents
an overview of three critical cases in the Supreme Court’s race-conscious
student-assignment jurisprudence: Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,20 Grutter v. Bollinger,21 and Gratz v. Bollinger.22 Finally, the article examines
the most recent Supreme Court decisions withdrawing judicial support for raceconscious education measures: Parents Involved and Fisher.23
13
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Derek W. Black, Education’s Elusive Future, Storied Past, And The
Fundamental Inequities Between, 46 Ga. L. Rev. 557, 563 (2012). Black discussed some of the
educational diversity gains post-Brown:

When Brown was decided in 1954, less than 0.1% of African-American students
attended integrated schools in the South. During the decade following Brown, very
little changed, but during the 1980s, more than 40% of African-American students
in the South attended integrated schools. More importantly, by breaking down racial
barriers to opportunity and reducing poverty isolation, African- American graduation
and college enrollment rates soared during this same period. The African-American
high school dropout rate was cut in half, falling from almost 30% to less than 15%,
and African-Americans’ college enrollment nearly doubled, rising from around 18%
to 30%.
Id.
14
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
15

438 U.S. 265, 269–324 (1978).

16

See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701; Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411.

17

551 U.S. 701.

18

133 S. Ct. 2411.

19

See infra notes 24–49 and accompanying text.

20

438 U.S. 265, 269–324 (1978).

21

539 U.S. 306 (2003).

22

539 U.S. 244 (2003); see infra notes 55–208 and accompanying text.

23

See infra notes 209–592 and accompanying text.
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I. Strict Scrutiny Standard Of Review
The United States Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o
state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”24 If a class is a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause, courts
apply strict scrutiny in review of the case.25 A classification is suspect if the class
is “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”26
Courts apply strict scrutiny to the Equal Protection Clause racial discrimination
claims because race is a suspect classification.27 To survive strict scrutiny review,
the government must show its classification is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling interest.28 In essence, “[s]trict scrutiny is, in simple terms, a bifurcated ends-means test. The government must pursue a compelling end, using
only those means necessary to achieve that end.”29 Strict scrutiny presumes
the government action is invalid, saddling the government with the burden of
overcoming that presumption.30
The Supreme Court identified two purposes for strict scrutiny. First, it is “a
device to ‘smoke out’ illicit governmental motive . . . ‘to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate
uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.’”31 Furthermore, the test ensures
24

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (discussing strict
scrutiny review).
25

26
Id. at 28; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.).

Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1988); George R. La Noue,
Western States’ Light: Restructuring The Federal Transportation Disadvantaged Business Enterprise
Program, 22 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 1, 5–6 (2011).
27

28
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56 (1973); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S.
200, 227–28 (1995).

Joshua P. Thompson & Adam R. Pomeroy, Desperately Seeking Scrutiny: Why The Supreme
Court Should Use Fisher v. University Of Texas To Restore Meaningful Review To Race-Based College
Admission Programs, 7 Charleston L. Rev. 139, 145 (2012). For a discussion of the history of
the Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, see Joseph Oluwole, The Supreme Court and
Whistleblowers: Teachers and Other Public Employees 135–50 (2008).
29

Harvard Law Review Association, Note, The Benefits Of Unequal Protection, 126
Harv. L. Rev. 1348, 1359 (2013). See Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin Of The Compelling State
Interest Test And Strict Scrutiny, 48 Am. J. Legal Hist. 355, 359–60 (2006) (“Strict scrutiny varies
from ordinary scrutiny by imposing three hurdles on the government. It shifts the burden of proof
to the government; requires the government to pursue a compelling state interest; and demands
that the regulation promoting the compelling interest be narrowly tailored.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
30

Siegel, supra note 30, at 393 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1989)).
31
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‘“the means chosen ‘fit’ this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no
possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice
or stereotype.’”32
The second purpose of the strict scrutiny test is to provide a cost-benefit
justification for governmental actions burdening “interests for which the
Constitution demands unusually high protection.”33 Whenever the government
treats any person unequally because of their race, ‘“that person has suffered an injury
that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution’s guarantee of
equal protection . . . . The application of strict scrutiny . . . determines whether a
compelling governmental interest justifies the infliction of that injury.’”34
Making a cost-benefit determination effectively opens the door for courts to
“second-guess” policy decisions of other government branches.35 Scholars view
“‘smoking out’ as strict scrutiny’s original purpose and the cost-benefit rationale as
a recent shift in strict scrutiny’s underlying principle brought about by the Court’s
determination to subject affirmative action legislation to the highest and most
rigid level of review.”36 The compelling-interest and narrow tailoring prongs of
strict scrutiny are designed to further the cost-benefit and ‘smoking out’ rationales
of strict scrutiny.
In line with the strict scrutiny rationales, the Supreme Court limited the
ambit of compelling interest in racial classifications. For instance, the Court ruled
that the government cannot claim a compelling interest in remedying general
societal discrimination.37 It, however, did recognize a compelling interest in using
racial classifications if the government seeks to remedy vestiges of past intentional
discrimination;38 and the compelling interest has a “strong basis in evidence.”39
Specifically, before embarking on an affirmative-action program, the government
must have a strong basis in evidence determining it needs to take remedial
action.40 Additionally, the government must show the discrimination it seeks
32
Siegel, supra note 30, at 393 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1989)).
33

Siegel, supra note 30, at 394.

34

Siegel, supra note 30, at 394 (quoting Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995)).

35

Siegel, supra note 30, at 397.

Siegel, supra note 30, at 394 (emphasis added). See also Siegel, supra note 30, at 397
(“Although many contemporary Justices foreswear second-guessing legislatures, the highprotectionist Justices who . . . invented strict scrutiny, were comfortable with that activity. They
thought it the essence of their role.”).
36

37

Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909–10 (1996).

Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
498–509 (1989).
38

39

Shaw, 517 U.S. at 910.

40

Id.
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to remedy is “identified discrimination”41 rather than a “generalized assertion of
past discrimination.”42 Apart from remedial use of race, the Supreme Court is
reticent to expand compelling interests in racial classifications. For example, while
the Court recognized diversity in higher education as a compelling interest,43 it
rejected racial proportionality and racial balancing as compelling interests.44 On
the other hand, the Court recognized diversity in higher education as a compel
ling interest.45
For a race-conscious plan to pass narrow tailoring muster, the Supreme
Court requires “the government to show it had exhausted facially neutral means
of promoting minority participation before it employed racial classifications to
achieve the same end.”46 Indeed, the Court’s narrow-tailoring analysis “demands
that the fit between the government’s action and its asserted purpose be as perfect
as practicable.”47 In other words, narrow tailoring requires a “tight means-end
fit,”48 and precise government action, not underinclusive or overinclusive actions.49
When asserting a compelling interest in remedying past discrimination, “narrow
tailoring, under current doctrine, requires evidence that the legislature observed
and intended to remedy lingering discriminatory impacts within the particular
institution affected by the remedial measure.”50 In the next section, we examine
41

Id. at 909.

42

Id.

43

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).

Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 551 U.S. 726–27 (2007)
(plurality opinion); Id. at 783–87 (Kennedy, J. concurring). See also Brandon Paradise, Racially
Transcendent Diversity, 50 U. Louisville L. Rev. 415, 481 (2012) (“while a majority of the Court
in Parents Involved believed that diversity could be a compelling interest in K–12 education, the
Court’s plurality opinion refused to find diversity compelling in the K–12 context”).
44

45

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.

Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness To Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground Of
Decision In Race Equality Cases, 120 Yale L.J. 1278, 1293 (2011); Siegel, supra note 30, at 360
(citing John Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, 82 Yale L.J. 920, 933 n.85 (1983)). See Siegel, supra
note 30, at 361 (characterizing strict scrutiny as the “oldest branch of strict scrutiny.”). See also
John C. Philo, Local Government Fiscal Emergencies And The Disenfranchisement Of Victims Of The
Global Recession, 13 J. L. Soc’y 71, 93 (2011) (“Embedded with concepts of narrow tailoring is
a requirement that the statute employ the least restrictive means available to advance the state’s
compelling interest.”).
46

47

Siegel, supra note 30, at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Elizabeth Price Foley, Judicial Engagement, Written Constitutions, And The Value Of
Preservation: The Case Of Individual Rights, 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 909, 920 (2012).
48

49

Siegel, supra note 30, at 360– 61.

Garrick B. Pursley, Dormancy, 100 Geo. L.J. 497, 510 (2012). Pursley discusses overenforcement as well as the strict scrutiny requirement of particularized discrimination:
50

A recognition that past racism has a lingering negative effect in society at large, or
even in state institutions at large, will not suffice; thus, the state law likely would be
invalidated. It would be invalidated even though an honest legislative intention to
remedy the harms of past discrimination might be an adequate reason for enacting

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol14/iss2/10
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the Supreme Court’s use of the strict scrutiny standard in review of race-conscious
measures in the educational context.

II. Bakke, Grutter, And Gratz
Beginning in 1978, the United States Supreme Court decided three affirma
tive action education cases applying the strict scrutiny standard: Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,51 Gratz v. Bollinger,52 and Grutter v. Bollinger.53
The following discussion of these cases provides context for the article’s
subsequent analysis of the judicial withdrawal of support for race-conscious
measures in Parents Involved and Fisher.54 The discussion reveals the Court’s
approach to analyzing race-conscious measures under the strict scrutiny standard,
including its narrow tailoring jurisprudence, which endorses race as a plus factor
in school admissions.55

A. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
Bakke was the first Supreme Court case to review voluntary race-conscious
measures. Allan Bakke, a white male, challenged the University of California
at Davis’ Medical School (UC Davis) special admissions program after
unsuccessfully applying for two consecutive years.56 UC Davis implemented a
special admissions program to increase ethnic minority representation once it
realized its student body had no American Indian, Black, or Mexican-American
students and only three Asians.57 The special admissions program had its own
admissions committee, distinct from the regular admissions committee, and was
mostly comprised of ethnic minorities.58 Applicants applied to UC Davis, which
then made the decision, based on information in the application, on whether the
special or regular committee would review the applicant.59

a racial classification in law, on a straightforward understanding of “adequate.” This
is over-enforcement-—the use of a constitutional decision rule that invalidates more
laws than actually violate the operative proposition. Again, strict scrutiny is an extreme
example; it predictably strikes down valid laws but upholds almost no violations.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
51

438 U.S. 265 (1978).

52

539 U.S. 244 (2003).

53

539 U.S. 306 (2003).

54

See infra notes 209–592 and accompanying text.

55

See infra notes 56 –208 and accompanying text.

56

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272, 276.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 274.

59

Id. at 274–76.
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The special admissions program began in 1973—the first year Allan Bakke
applied to UC Davis. That year, the special committee reviewed candidates whose
applications indicated that the applicant preferred to be reviewed as “economically
and/or educationally disadvantaged.”60 In 1974, UC Davis changed the categories
from “economically and/or educationally disadvantaged” to the minority groups of
Chicanos, Asians, Blacks, or American Indians.61 Although the special admissions
committee generally reviewed this applicant pool of disadvantaged minorities
using similar criteria as the regular admissions committee, it eliminated the 2.5
grade point average (GPA) cutoff applicable to regular applicants.62
After interviews and benchmark scoring, the special committee recommended
the top special applicants to the regular admissions committee.63 The regular
admissions committee did not evaluate special applicants against regular
applicants.64 Instead, the committee admitted special applicants until they filled
the total number of seats designated for special applicants in the entering class.65
No white applicant who applied to the special admissions program was offered
admission through that process.66
The regular admissions program denied Bakke admission and he was not
considered under the special admissions program for minorities.67 Bakke
complained to the medical school that the special admissions program was a
racial quota precluding his admission.68 Indeed, in both years Bakke applied,
special applicants with “significantly lower” MCAT scores, GPAs, and benchmark
scores were admitted.69 Consequently, Bakke pursued declaratory, mandatory,

60

Id.

Id. Minorities who did not belong to these categories or those who chose not to be reviewed
as minorities could apply to through the regular admissions process like every other non-minority
applicant.
61

62

Id. at 275.

63

Id.

64

Id.

Id. In 1973, UC Davis set aside eight seats out of the overall class of fifty for special
applicants. In 1974, sixteen of the overall class of 100 were set aside for special applicants. See also id.
at 275–76 (“From the year of the increase in class size—1971—through 1974, the special program
resulted in the admission of 21 black students, 30 Mexican-Americans, and 12 Asians, for a total of
63 minority students. Over the same period, the regular admissions program produced 1 black, 6
Mexican-Americans, and 37 Asians, for a total of 44 minority students.”).
65

66
Id. at 276. See id. at 275 n.5 (“For the class entering in 1973, the total number of special
applicants was 297, of whom 73 were white. In 1974, 628 persons applied to the special committee,
of whom 172 were white.”).
67

Id. at 276 –77.

68

Id. at 276.

69

Id. at 277.
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and injunctive remedies in court claiming that the special admissions program
violated his right to Equal Protection.70
In a divided 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court invalidated the special admis
sions program.71 Several Justices wrote or joined various opinions explaining their
reasoning.72 Justice Powell authored the Court’s judgment, writing an opinion
not joined by any other Justice.73 However, as the Supreme Court subsequently
noted, “[s]ince this Court’s splintered decision in Bakke, Justice Powell’s opinion
announcing the judgment of the Court has served as the touchstone for
constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies.”74 Given the pivotal
role the Court accorded Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion, this section focuses on his
opinion only.
Rejecting the argument that strict scrutiny does not protect white males,75
Justice Powell stated that classifying people only on the basis of race is “odious
to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”76
Consequently, Justice Powell declared that, regardless of race or ethnicity,
whenever classifications “touch upon an individual’s race or ethnic background,
70

Id. at 278.

71

Id. at 266–67.

Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court and wrote an opinion not joined
by any other Justice. Id. at 289–324. Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and White wrote an
opinion partly concurring in the judgment and dissenting. Id. at 324–79. Justice White wrote a
separate opinion. Id. at 379–87. Justice Marshall wrote a separate opinion. Id. at 387–402. Justice
Blackmun wrote a separate opinion. Id. at 402–08. Justices Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Chief
Justice Burger wrote an opinion partly concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part. Id. at
408–21. See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322 (2003) (providing an overview of the
divided nature of the Bakke opinion).
72

73

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289–324.

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323. Further, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
stated that “Justice Powell’s opinion is binding on this court under Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977).” Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 739 (6th Cir. 2008), aff ’d, 539 U.S. 306.
74

See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289–90. See also id. at 305 (“When a classification denies an
individual opportunities or benefits enjoyed by others solely because of his race or ethnic back
ground, it must be regarded as suspect” (citing McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637,
641– 42 (1950))).
75

76
Id. at 290–91 (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). See also id.
at 292–93 (“As the Nation filled with the stock of many lands, the reach of the [Equal Protection]
Clause was gradually extended to all ethnic groups seeking protection from official discrimination.
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880) (Celtic Irishmen) (dictum);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (Chinese); Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33, 41, 36 S.Ct. 7, 10, 60 L.Ed. 131 (1915) (Austrian resident aliens); Korematsu,
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Japanese); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 74
S.Ct. 667, 98 L.Ed. 866 (1954) (Mexican-Americans). The guarantees of equal protection, said the
Court in Yick Wo, ‘are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the
laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.’”).
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he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on
that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. The
Constitution guarantees that right to every person regardless of his background.”77
Justice Powell stated that if UC Davis designed its program to guarantee
admission of a “specified percentage” of a particular race or ethnicity, the program
would be unconstitutional.78 While conceding that remedying “wrongs worked
by specific instances of racial discrimination” is a compelling interest, Justice
Powell stated that such remedial use of race must be preceded by legislative,
administrative, or judicial findings of statutory or constitutional violations.79
Educational institutions are unable to make such findings; accordingly, UC
Davis failed to satisfy its burden of justifying the use of race for remedying past
intentional discrimination.80 Powell stated that using race to remedy the effects of
societal discrimination was not a compelling interest because such an interest is
“an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past.”81
Bakke marks the first time the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence
recognized “attainment of a diverse student body” as a compelling interest.82 In
fact, Justice Powell presented it as an indisputable interest.83 Specifically, he stated
that the attainment of diversity is “clearly” a compelling interest for institutions
of higher education.84 He reasoned that academic freedom, protected under the
First Amendment, demands that universities be permitted to make educational
judgments, including student selection, to ensure universities are institutions that
expose students to a “robust exchange of ideas” attendant to a diverse student
body.85 Diversity protects our nation’s future, because the “nation’s future depends

Id. at 299 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938).
77

78

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.

Id. (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367–76 (1977); U. Jewish Organizations
v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 155–56 (1977); S. Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)). See
also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302 (“But we have never approved preferential classifications in the absence
of proved constitutional or statutory violations.”).
79

See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309 (“Petitioner does not purport to have made, and is in no position
to make, such findings. Its broad mission is education, not the formulation of any legislative policy
or the adjudication of particular claims of illegality. For reasons similar to those stated in Part III of
this opinion, isolated segments of our vast governmental structures are not competent to make those
decisions, at least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined criteria . . . .
Lacking this capability, petitioner has not carried its burden of justification on this issue.”).
80

81

Id. at 307.

Id. at 311–12. Justice Powell concluded that this diversity interest applies at the under
graduate and graduate levels. Id. at 313–14.
82

83

Id.

84

Id. at 311–12.

85

Id.
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upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the ideas and mores of students as
diverse as this Nation of many peoples.”86
Justice Powell cautioned that, while schools must have latitude regarding
admission, the Constitution’s limitations require that race be “only one element
in a range of factors a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of
a heterogeneous student body.”87 He explained that “[t]he diversity that furthers
a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important
element.”88 The UC Davis program did not promote “genuine diversity” because
it focused only on racial diversity.89 While racial quotas can be a means to achieve
diversity, this is not the “only effective means.”90 In fact, Justice Powell rejected
any contrary contention as “seriously flawed.”91 Diversity passing constitutional
muster is not “simple ethnic diversity,” such as racial set asides or quotas.92
According to Justice Powell, constitutional use of narrowly tailored race
measures involves using race as one of various plus factors:
In such an admissions program, race or ethnic background may
be deemed a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file, yet it does not
insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates
for the available seats. The file of a particular black applicant may
Id. at 313 (internal quotations omitted). In fact, Justice Powell characterized diversity as a
paramount interest:
86

[I]n arguing that its universities must be accorded the right to select those students
who will contribute the most to the ‘robust exchange of ideas,’ petitioner invokes
a countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First Amendment. In this light,
petitioner must be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance
in the fulfillment of its mission.
Id. (emphasis added).
87

Id. at 314.

88

Id. at 315.

89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id.

Id. (“It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the
student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, with the remaining
percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of students.”). Justice clearly rejected a multitrack racial
quota system as a constitutional alternative to a two-track system:
92

Nor would the state interest in genuine diversity be served by expanding petitioner’s
two-track system into a multitrack program with a prescribed number of seats set
aside for each identifiable category of applicants. Indeed, it is inconceivable that a
university would thus pursue the logic of petitioner’s two-track program to the illogical
end of insulating each category of applicants with certain desired qualifications from
competition with all other applicants.
Id.
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be examined for his potential contribution to diversity without
the factor of race being decisive when compared, for example,
with that of an applicant identified as an Italian-American if
the latter is thought to exhibit qualities more likely to promote
beneficial educational pluralism. Such qualities could include
exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience,
leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a
history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate
with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important. In
short, an admissions program operated in this way is flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of
the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them
on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily
according them the same weight. Indeed, the weight attributed
to a particular quality may vary from year to year depending
upon the ‘mix’ both of the student body and the applicants for
the incoming class.93
Because other universities’ admissions programs successfully used race as a
plus factor rather than “simple ethnic diversity” to ensure educational diversity,
Justice Powell opined that the UC Davis program failed the narrow tailoring
requirement.94 This reasoning crystalized the need for K–12 and higher education
93

Id. at 317–18.

Id. at 316–17, 320. One program Justice Powell cited is the Harvard College program
which used race as one of many factors in admissions. Here is the description of the Harvard
College program:
94

In recent years Harvard College has expanded the concept of diversity to include
students from disadvantaged economic, racial and ethnic groups. Harvard College
now recruits not only Californians or Louisianans but also blacks and Chicanos and
other minority students. Contemporary conditions in the United States mean that
if Harvard College is to continue to offer a first-rate education to its students,
minority representation in the undergraduate body cannot be ignored by the
Committee on Admissions.
In practice, this new definition of diversity has meant that race has been a
factor in some admission decisions. When the Committee on Admissions reviews
the large middle group of applicants who are ‘admissible’ and deemed capable of
doing good work in their courses, the race of an applicant may tip the balance in his
favor just as geographic origin or a life spent on a farm may tip the balance in other
candidates’ cases. A farm boy from Idaho can bring something to Harvard College
that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can usually bring something
that a white person cannot offer. The quality of the educational experience of all the
students in Harvard College depends in part on these differences in the background
and outlook that students bring with them.
In Harvard College admissions the Committee has not set target-quotas for
the number of blacks, or of musicians, football players, physicists or Californians
to be admitted in a given year. At the same time the Committee is aware that if
Harvard College is to provide a truly heterogen[e]ous environment that reflects the
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schools to consistently study various race-conscious programs used around the
country, ensuring the school is pursuing the least-restrictive program available.
Under a narrowly tailored program that passes muster under Justice Powell’s
view, each applicant is reviewed as an individual rather than solely typed by race.95
Justice Powell foresaw a “race-as-a-plus-factor” system as one where applicants
denied admission would be less likely to bring any challenges or successful
challenges against race-conscious admissions programs:
This kind of program treats each applicant as an individual
in the admissions process. The applicant who loses out on the
last available seat to another candidate receiving a ‘plus’ on the
basis of ethnic background will not have been foreclosed from
all consideration for that seat simply because he was not the
right color or had the wrong surname. It would mean only that
his combined qualifications, which may have included similar
nonobjective factors, did not outweigh those of the other
applicant. His qualifications would have been weighed fairly
and competitively, and he would have no basis to complain of
unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment.96
However, as evident in Gratz v. Bollinger, 97 Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 98 and other challenges to admissions
plans using race as a plus factor, Justice Powell was ultimately wrong. Such
programs are actually likely to face successful challenges.99
rich diversity of the United States, it cannot be provided without some attention to
numbers. It would not make sense, for example, to have 10 or 20 students out of
1,100 whose homes are west of the Mississippi. Comparably, 10 or 20 black students
could not begin to bring to their classmates and to each other the variety of points of
view, backgrounds and experiences of blacks in the United States. Their small numbers
might also create a sense of isolation among the black students themselves and thus
make it more difficult for them to develop and achieve their potential. Consequently,
when making its decisions, the Committee on Admissions is aware that there is some
relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse
student body, and between numbers and providing a reasonable environment for
those students admitted. But that awareness does not mean that the Committee sets
a minimum number of blacks or of people from west of the Mississippi who are to
be admitted.
Id. at 322–24.
95

Id. at 316–18.

96

Id. at 318.

97

539 U.S. 244 (2003).

98

551 U.S. 701 (2007).

For examples of successful challenges to race-conscious measures, see Eisenberg v.
Montgomery Cty. Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019 (2000);
Tuttle v. Arlington Cty. Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1050
99
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B. Gratz v. Bollinger
The next Supreme Court venture into affirmative action at the higher edu
cation level was the 2003 same-day decisions Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v.
Bollinger.100 This section examines the Court’s analysis of the race-conscious
undergraduate admissions policy in Gratz.101 Sub-section C discusses the Grutter
case, which involved a graduate admissions policy.102
In Gratz, the Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to the University of
Michigan’s (UM) undergraduate race-conscious admissions policy.103 Two
Caucasian applicants—Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher—applied to UM’s
College of Literature, Science, and the Arts for fall 1995 and 1997 respectively.104
Both applicants were denied admission, prompting them to challenge the
race-conscious program for undergraduate admissions as violating their Equal
Protection Clause rights.105 The case was a class-action suit covering those denied
admission back to the year 1995.106 The Court agreed with the plaintiffs that
the race-conscious program was unconstitutional because it failed the strict
scrutiny standard.107
Under all pertinent periods of this case, UM’s race-conscious program classified
Hispanics, African-Americans, and Native Americans as “underrepresented
minorities.”108 This classification helped UM enhance its minority representation
because nearly every applicant who qualified for this classification and satisfied
UM’s race-conscious application-evaluation process was admitted.109 UM’s
application-evaluation process in 1995 and 1996 combined an applicant’s GPA,
geographical residence, unusual circumstances, alumni relationships, and strength
of high school curriculum to create a “GPA 2” score.110 The GPA 2 score was then
considered along with race and the applicant’s American College Test/Scholastic

(2000); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 151–52 (4th Cir. 1994); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160
F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998). For a great analysis of these cases and others, see Julie F. Mead, Devilish
Details: Exploring Features of Charter School Statutes That Blur the Public/Private Distinction, 40
Harv. J. on Legis. 349 (2003).
100

539 U.S. 306 (2003).

101

See infra notes 104–45 and accompanying text.

102

See infra notes 146–208 and accompanying text.

103

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).

104

Id. at 251.

105

Id. at 252.

106

Id. at 253.

107

Id. at 249–51, 275.

108

Id. at 254.

109

Id.

110

Id. at 254 –55.
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Aptitude Test (ACT/SAT) score.111 “[A]pplicants with the same GPA 2 score and
ACT/SAT score were subject to different admissions outcomes based upon their
racial or ethnic status.”112 A minority applicant with the same GPA 2 and ACT/
SAT scores as Gratz qualified for admission whereas Gratz did not.113
In 1997, UM added extra points to the “unusual circumstances” factor in
computing GPA 2 scores for applicants from socioeconomic disadvantage,
underrepresented minority groups, or high schools primarily composed of
underrepresented minorities.114 A minority applicant with the same GPA 2
and ACT/SAT scores as Hamacher qualified for admission whereas Hamacher
did not.115
In 1998, UM replaced this system with a “selection index.”116 Points were
awarded for GPA, high school quality, ACT/SAT scores, personal essay, in-state
residency, personal leadership/accomplishment, alumni relationship, weakness/
strength of high school curriculum, and a miscellaneous category.117 Race applied
under the miscellaneous category: “an applicant was entitled to 20 points based
upon his or her membership in an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority
group.”118 Applicants could get up to 150 points under this new system.119
Admission decisions based on the index points were as follows: “100–150
(admit); 95–99 (admit or postpone); 90–94 (postpone or admit); 75–89 (delay
or postpone); 74 and below (delay or reject).”120
Under all of UM’s admission systems, UM’s guidelines stated that qualified
minority candidates should be offered admission “as soon as possible” because
the university believed that minorities were more likely to enroll if they received
expeditious offers.121 UM made it a policy to reserve “protected seats” for
underrepresented minority, international student, athlete, and Reserve Officer
Training Corp (ROTC) applications received later in the application cycle.122

111

Id. at 254.

112

Id.

113

Id.

Id. at 255. Beginning in 1997, the “unusual circumstances” factor also included extra
points for persons seeking to pursue fields of study with an underrepresentation of a demographic.
Id. This demographic was not limited to race. Id.
114

115

Id.

116

Id. at 255–56.

117

Id. at 255.

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Id.

121

Id. at 256.

122

Id.
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While UM continued using the selection index in 1999, that year, it added an
extra level of review for some applications through the creation of an Admissions
Review Committee (ARC).123 Admission counselors were authorized to consider
race along with other factors in determining select applications to send to the
ARC.124 The ARC was empowered to disregard the selection-index points in
making final admission decisions.125 In analyzing UM’s admissions program, the
Supreme Court reiterated strict scrutiny’s governance of all racial classifications.126
The Court stated that—irrespective of the race of the person benefited or burdened
by the classification—the classification must be strictly scrutinized because racial
classifications, whether benign or invidious, are “simply too pernicious.”127
Within this framework, and relying on Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, UM
contended that its race-conscious admissions program served a compelling interest
in producing the educational benefits flowing from a racially diverse student
population.128 The Court agreed that diversity is a compelling interest,129 rejecting
Gratz and Hamacher’s contrary argument that diversity was “too open-ended, illdefined, and indefinite” to be compelling.130 UM’s race-conscious policy, however,
failed narrowly tailored review by automatically assigning twenty points to every
minority applicant.131 UM’s policy failed Justice Powell’s “race-as-a-plus-factor”
policy from Bakke because UM’s race-based automatic assignment of points made
race the decisive predictor of each applicant’s contribution to diversity.132 The
Court decried the UM policy for not complying with Justice Powell’s opinion that
applicants must receive individualized consideration, with race being just one of
several factors.133 In essence, the Court endorsed Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion as
the touchstone for reviewing race-conscious student assignment plans.134
123

Id. at 256–57.

124

Id.

Id.; see also id. at 274 (“review committee can look at the applications individually and
ignore the points”).
125

126

Id. at 270.

127

Id.

128

Id. at 257.

129

Id. at 268–70.

130

Id. at 268.

Id. at 270 (“We find that the University’s policy, which automatically distributes 20 points,
or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single ‘underrepresented minority’
applicant solely because of race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational
diversity that respondents claim justifies their program.”). The Court contrasted the UM policy
with the Harvard College admissions program (outlined in an earlier footnote herein) which Justice
Powell upheld as a model of the “race-as-a-plus-factor” policy; and found the UM policy wanting
because, unlike the Harvard program, UM’s policy did not allow individualized evaluation of
applicants. Id. at 273. See also generally id. at 272–73 (discussing the Harvard program and its
contrast with the UM policy).
131

132

Id. at 270–72.

133

Id. at 271.

134

Id. at 270–76.
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The Court stated that the automatic point assignment made race decisive
for almost all “minimally qualified” minorities.135 The Court faulted UM’s
race-based automatic assignment of points as premised on the “presumption
that persons think in a manner associated with their race.”136 While the ARC
could look at applications individually, that was of “little comfort under [a] strict
scrutiny analysis” because such individualized consideration was undisputedly
“the exception and not the rule” in the UM program.137 Furthermore, the UM
policy was found wanting because the record failed to show exactly how many
applications underwent individualized ARC review.138 Without an adequate record
showing that a substantial number of applicants underwent individualized review,
a school cannot make a successful argument that its race-conscious program is
narrowly tailored. Additionally, the Court ruled that despite ARC’s existence,
UM’s program still failed the narrow tailoring prong because it made race a
decisive factor for virtually all minimally qualified minorities.139 Indeed, ARC’s
“individualized review is only provided after admissions counselors automatically
distribute the University’s version of a ‘plus’ that makes race a decisive factor for
virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant.”140
Finally, the Court ruled on whether administrative challenges can justify a
school’s decision to use quotas instead of the “race-as-a-plus-factor” approach.141
UM contended that the volume of applications made it impractical to use Justice
Powell’s “race-as-a-plus-factor” approach—the approach subsequently approved
by the Court in Grutter.142 The Court rejected UM’s contention and warned
schools that the bureaucratic challenges of implementing individualized review of
applicants are not an excuse for an unconstitutional policy.143

C. Grutter v. Bollinger
Similar to Gratz, Grutter v. Bollinger 144 is an affirmative action case involving
higher education. In Grutter, Barbara Grutter, a Caucasian applicant with a 161
Law School Admission Test (LSAT) score and a 3.8 GPA, was denied admission
135
Id. at 272. The Court revealed that UM conceded this as well. See id. at 273 (“the
University has conceded, the effect of automatically awarding 20 points is that virtually every
qualified underrepresented minority applicant is admitted”).

Id. at 271 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 618 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
136

137

Id. at 274.

138

Id.

139

Id.

140

Id.

141

Id. at 275.

142

Id. For the discussion of Grutter see infra notes 146–208 and accompanying text.

143

Id. Here as well the Court relied on Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion. Id.

144

539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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to the University of Michigan Law School (Law School).145 She challenged the
Law School’s race-conscious admissions policy as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.146
The Law School relied on Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion in designing its
admissions policy 147—ensuring each applicant received individualized con
sideration of her entire application, including the applicant’s essay discussing how
she would contribute to the Law School’s diversity.148 As part of the application
process, the Law School evaluated the applicant’s LSAT score and GPA, as
well as “soft variables” such as the enthusiasm in letters of recommendation,
level of difficulty of applicant’s undergraduate courses, quality of applicant’s
undergraduate institution, and personal statement.149 The policy stated that GPA
and test scores were not dispositive.150 Justice O’Connor characterized the policy’s
“focus on academic ability coupled with a flexible assessment of applicants’
talents, experiences, and potential to contribute to the learning of those around
them” as the policy’s “hallmark.”151 The Law School’s race-conscious admissions
policy152 ensured representation of students with strong capabilities from various
experiences and backgrounds.153
Under the policy, diversity could be given “substantial weight” in admissions
decisions.154 Diversity was not limited just to race, as there were “many possible
bases for diversity admissions,”155 including international background or
experience, non-traditional student age, or an advanced degree.156 The policy
conveyed the Law School’s “longstanding commitment” to racial diversity and its
goal of enrolling a “critical mass” of minorities, ensuring the educational benefits

145

Id. at 316–17.

146

Id. at 311.

147

Id. at 314.

148

Id. at 315.

149

Id.

150

Id.

151

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

152

Id. at 316.

Id. at 312–15. See also id. at 315 (“The policy aspires to achieve that diversity which has
the potential to enrich everyone’s education and thus make a law school class stronger than the sum
of its parts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
153

154

Id.

Id. at 316 (“The policy does not define diversity solely in terms of racial and ethnic status.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
155

156
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 736 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that the university
considered as diversity “an Olympic gold medal, a Ph.D. in physics, the attainment of age 50 in
a class that otherwise lacked anyone over 30, or the experience of having been a Vietnamese boat
person” for example).
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of diversity.157 Specifically, the policy expressed the Law School’s commitment
to “racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students
from groups which have been historically discriminated against, like African–
Americans, Hispanics and Native–Americans, who without this commitment
might not be represented in our student body in meaningful numbers.”158
The Law School, described “critical mass” as “meaningful numbers or
meaningful representation . . . a number that encourages underrepresented
minority students to participate in the classroom and not feel isolated.”159 Despite
this reference to numbers in defining critical mass, the Law School did not use
racial quotas.160 According to the Court, a quota refers to a “program in which a
certain fixed number or proportion of opportunities are reserved exclusively for
certain minority groups.”161 The Law School did not use the “critical mass” concept
in its policy “simply to assure within its student body some specified percentage of
a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.”162 The Court stated
that if the Law School intended “critical mass” to mean racial quotas, “critical
mass” would constitute racial balancing which is “patently unconstitutional.”163
Instead, the Law School defined “critical mass” by linking it to the educational
benefits of diversity.164
The Court recognized the following educational diversity benefits: (i) crossracial understanding; (ii) dismantling racial stereotypes; (iii) more animated,
interesting, and enlightening class discussions; (iv) improved learning outcomes;
(v) better preparation to participate in an increasingly diverse work force; and
157
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316, 318. The Law School stated that its policy was not designed to
remedy past intentional discrimination. Id. at 319.
158
Id. at 316. The Law School explained that Jews and Asians were not mentioned because the
Law School had admitted them in significant numbers. Id. at 319.
159

Id. at 318.

Id. at 335–36; see also id. at 318 (order of quotes is not chronological) (“Munzel stated there
is no number, percentage, or range of numbers or percentages that constitute critical mass;” “Dennis
Shields, Director of Admissions when petitioner applied to the Law School, testified that he did
not direct his staff to admit a particular percentage or number of minority students, but rather to
consider an applicant’s race along with all other factors.”). See id. at 318–19 (stating that the law
school dean testified as other witnesses that critical mass was not defined based on percentages or
numbers). Even Grutter’s expert witness acknowledged that race was not “the predominant factor”
in admissions. Id. at 320 (internal quotation marks omitted).
160

161
Id. at 335 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 496 (1989) (plurality opinion)). See also id. (“Quotas impose a fixed number or percentage
which must be attained, or which cannot be exceeded.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)). Id. at 334 (“To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program
cannot use a quota system.”).
162

Id. at 329.

163

Id. at 330 (emphasis added); id. at 335–36.

164

Id.
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(vi) improved preparation of students as professionals.165 The Court found the
educational benefits of this race-conscious admissions policy significant despite
Grutter’s contention that the Law School had no compelling interest.166 It further
emphasized that these educational benefits of diversity are “not theoretical but
real.”167 A colorblind approach to admissions would undermine these educational
diversity benefits. The Law School argued that a colorblind admissions policy
would produce a “very dramatic, negative effect” on minorities.168 They further
contended that “when a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is
present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students learn
there is no minority viewpoint but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority
students.”169 In its compelling-interest analysis, the Supreme Court noted that,
in Bakke, it found a compelling interest in the “competitive consideration of race
and ethnic origin” in admissions decisions.170 This interest can be served if the
admissions program is “properly devised.”171
In terms of a properly devised program’s parameters, the Grutter Court
confirmed Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion as the constitutional touchstone.172 The
Court expressly endorsed Justice Powell’s opinion that diversity is a compelling
interest and that admission programs can use race as a plus factor to promote
diversity as long as the program meets the narrowly tailored prong.173
The Court emphasized that strict scrutiny must be applied to all racial
classifications, including remedial or benign classifications.174 This rule is
critical in “smok[ing] out” illegitimate racial classifications175 and ensuring the
165

Id.

166

Id. at 317.

Id. Given these benefits, it is important to train a diverse student body in a diverse
educational setting. Id. at 331.
167

168

Id. at 320 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the Law School,
in 2000, 35 percent of underrepresented minority applicants were admitted. Dr.
Raudenbush predicted that if race were not considered, only 10 percent of those
applicants would have been admitted. Under this scenario, underrepresented minority
students would have constituted 4 percent of the entering class in 2000 instead of the
actual figure of 14.5 percent.

Id. at 320 (internal citations omitted).
169

Id. at 319–20.

Id. at 322–23. The Court rejected the contention that race-conscious policies can only be
used to remedy past discrimination. Id. at 328.
170

171
Id. at 322–23. The Court rejected the contention that race-conscious policies can only be
used to remedy past discrimination. Id. at 328.
172

Id. at 323–24.

Id. at 325 (“[T]oday we endorse Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is a
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.”).
173

174

Id. at 326.

175

Id.
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government’s end for the racial classification is so vital that it justifies a “highly
suspect tool” such as a race-conscious measure.176 Although the Court affirmed
the rule that all racial classifications must be strictly scrutinized, it required courts
to consider context in their review.177 In other words, the Constitution does not
view every use of race as “equally objectionable.”178 Instead, courts must consider
the following contextual factors: (i) the sincerity of the government’s reasons for
using race in that specific context;179 and (ii) the importance of the government’s
reasons for using race in that specific context.180
The Supreme Court found that the Law School had a compelling interest
in a “diverse student body.”181 The Court chose to defer to the “educational
judgment” of the Law School that “such diversity is essential to its educational
mission.”182 As support, the Court pointed to the record which showed that
the Law School would reap educational benefits from diversity.183 The Court
reasoned that deference was justified because the educational judgments of
schools are “complex” and “primarily” the university’s expertise.184 Additionally,
schools have leeway to make decisions because of the First Amendment right
to academic freedom.185 The Court stated that its decision recognizing the Law
School’s compelling interest in diversity was “informed by” the Court’s view that
student diversity is at the core of the “proper institutional mission.”186 In other
words, schools can pursue student diversity as a “proper institutional mission.”187
Additionally, the Court presumed that, unless shown otherwise, universities
exercise good faith in choosing diversity as a compelling interest to pursue.188
The Court concluded that the Law School’s use of race was narrowly tailored
because it did not involve a racial quota.189 The Court stated that a school’s mere
attention to numbers does not make the school’s race-conscious admissions plan a

176

Id.

177

Id. at 327 (“Context matters”).

178

Id.

179

Id.

180

Id.

181

Id. at 328.

182

Id.

183

Id.

184

Id.

Id. Justice Powell emphasized the latter in Bakke. See id. at 329 (emphasis added) (citing
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
185

186

Id. (emphasis added).

187

Id.

188

Id.

189

Id. at 334, 343.
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rigid quota.190 Narrow tailoring only requires a “good faith effort” in race-conscious
policies to “come within a [numerical or percentage] range demarcated by the
goal [diversity] itself.”191 This reference to good faith implies a level of deference
to schools in narrow tailoring analysis in that the Court is at least willing to credit
good faith efforts of schools in its review of whether the school’s plan operates as
a quota or as a demarcation of range.192
The Court stated that race-conscious programs that “insulat[e] each category
of applicants with certain desired qualifications from competition with all other
applicants” are not narrowly tailored.193 However, if race is merely a “plus” in an
applicant’s file and the process requires all applicants to compete for seats, the
program likely passes narrow tailoring muster.194 Providing further guidance on
narrow tailoring, the Court called for flexibility in race-conscious programs so
they can account for all relevant forms of diversity.195 In particular, such programs
must be “flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light
of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same
footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same
weight.”196 In other words, while race is on the same footing as other elements of
diversity, rather than being dispositive, race does not have to be weighted the same

190
Id. at 336. The Court said this in response to the fact that the Law School daily tracked the
racial composition of its entering class. Id. at 318, 336.
191
Id. at 335 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986) (O’Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
192
Further evidence of deference in the Court’s narrow tailoring discussion is seen in the
Court’s statement that “[w]e take the Law School at its word that it would like nothing better than
to find a race-neutral admissions formula and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program
as soon as practicable” Id. at 343 (internal quotation marks omitted).
193

Id. at 334.

194

Id. at 334–35.

See id. at 334 (“As Justice Powell made clear in Bakke, truly individualized consideration
demands that race be used in a flexible, nonmechanical way.”). The Grutter Court elaborated upon
the required flexibility:
195

When using race as a ‘plus’ factor in university admissions, a university’s admissions
program must remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an
individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining
feature of his or her application. The importance of this individualized consideration
in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is paramount.
Id. at 336–37. The relevant forms of diversity are “all [the] factors that may contribute to student
body diversity” which must be “meaningfully considered alongside race in admissions decisions.” Id.
at 337. These factors could include a unique educational background, international experience or
background, fluency in foreign languages as well as remarkable talents or accomplishments.
Id. at 334 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.)).
196
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as other diversity elements in the plan.197 Placing more weight on race compared
to other elements is merely another way of stating that race can be one of the plus
factors in reviewing applications.
The Court emphasized that narrowly tailored plans provide individualized
consideration of applicants.198 Under such plans, different races cannot be
placed on “separate admission tracks.”199 The Court stressed that, unlike
the unconstitutional policy in Gratz, a narrowly tailored plan does not give
“mechanical, predetermined diversity ‘bonuses’ based on race or ethnicity.”200 A
narrowly tailored race-conscious plan does not provide for “de jure or de facto . . .
automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single soft variable.”201
The Court underscored the rule that schools do not have to exhaust “every
conceivable race-neutral alternative” to satisfy narrow tailoring.202 Instead, narrow
tailoring merely requires “serious, good faith consideration of workable raceneutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks.”203 The
Court rejected the false choice between academic excellence of an institution and
a diverse education; narrow tailoring does not require this choice nor does it create
a Hobson’s choice.204 Further, narrowly tailored race-conscious plans do not create
undue burdens for non-intended minority and non-minority beneficiaries.205
Finally, narrowly tailored plans must have a durational limit or logical stopping
point.206 This durational limit is met by including “sunset provisions in race-

Id. at 335 (“Justice Powell flatly rejected the argument that Harvard’s program was ‘the
functional equivalent of a quota’ merely because it had some ‘plus’ for race, or gave greater ‘weight’
to race than to some other factors, in order to achieve student body diversity.” (emphasis added)).
197

198

Id. at 334.

199

Id.

200

Id. at 337.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Test scores and grades are hard
variables. Soft variables are those considered in admissions beyond the test scores and grades. They
could include race, “the enthusiasm of recommenders, the quality of the undergraduate institution,
the quality of the applicant’s essay, and the areas and difficulty of undergraduate course selection.”
Id. at 315. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1., 551 U.S. 701, 843 (2007)
(defining the difference between de facto and de jure segregation as follows: “the well-established
conceptual difference between de jure segregation (‘segregation by state action’) and de facto
segregation (‘racial imbalance caused by other factors’”)).
201

202

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.

203

Id.

204

Id.

205

Id. at 341.

Id. at 342. The Court reasoned that “racial classifications, however compelling their goals,
are potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands.
Enshrining a permanent justification for racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal
protection principle.” Id.
206
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conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine whether racial
preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”207 Ultimately, the
Court concluded by urging schools to learn from race-neutral programs used at
other schools in the country to transition away from race-conscious programs.208

III. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1
The Supreme Court first considered voluntary race-conscious admissions
policies in the K–12 education context in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. In this case, the Court considered whether
voluntary race-conscious plans in Seattle School District No. 1, Washington
(Seattle) and Jefferson County Public Schools, Kentucky (JCPS) violated the
Equal Protection Clause.209
Seattle implemented a series of tiebreakers for assigning students to
oversubscribed high schools, one of which was race-conscious.210 The district
voluntarily implemented the racial tiebreaker even though it had neither been
under a desegregation decree nor run segregated schools.211 It chose to use the
racial tiebreaker to ameliorate the impact of racially segregated housing on schools’
racial composition.212
Under the race-based tiebreaker, the district considered the individual
student’s race along with the school’s racial demographics when assigning
students.213 Schools that the district deemed racially imbalanced were eligible for
racial integration.214 A school was deemed racially imbalanced if it had a racial
composition that was not within 10% of the district’s overall white/nonwhite
racial demographics.215 This white/nonwhite composition was about 41% to 59%
respectively.216 The white/nonwhite racial categories were the only two used in the
district’s plan.217 Several parents challenged the racial tiebreaker’s constitutionality

207
Id. In essence, schools need to plan for and implement formative and summative assessments
of their racial-conscious plans.
208

Id. at 342–43.

209

551 U.S. 701, 709–18 (2007).

210

Id. at 711–12.

211

Id. at 712.

212

Id. at 712–13.

213

Id. at 712.

214

Id.

215

Id.

216

Id. at 712.

217

Id. at 712–13, 723.
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under the Equal Protection Clause.218 The United States District Court for the
District of Washington held that the racial tiebreaker was narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling interest.219
In Kentucky, within a year after the dissolution of Jefferson County Public
Schools’ desegregation decree, the district voluntarily implemented a raceconscious assignment plan to maintain its gains from desegregation220 and to
ensure that black students in its non-magnet elementary schools constituted
between 15% and 50% of enrollment at each school.221 Under the plan, students
were classified as either black or “other.”222 Black students constituted about 34%
of the district’s student population; most of the other 66% were Caucasian.223 If a
student’s choice of school led to racial imbalance, the district denied the student
assignment to the school.224 Crystal Meredith brought an Equal Protection Clause
challenge after her son was denied assignment to his choice of schools because of
the race-conscious policy.225 The United States District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky ultimately held that the race-conscious policy was narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling interest, namely diversity.226
Following the review of the district courts’ decisions, both the Ninth and
Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeal affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, finding
the assignment plans constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.227 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a district that has never run
segregated schools or one that has attained unitary status can use race-conscious
student assignment plans.228

218

Id. at 713–14.

Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1240
(W.D. Wash. 2001).
219

220

McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 841–48 (W.D. Ky. 2004).

For more on the Jefferson County race-conscious plan, see McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d
834. To learn more about the desegregation cases involving Jefferson County Public Schools, see
Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cty., 489 F. 2d 925 (6th Cir. 1974),
vacated, 418 U.S. 918, modified, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974); Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 72 F. Supp. 2d 753 (W.D. Ky. 1999); Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp.
2d 358 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
221

222

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 723.

223

Id. at 716.

224

Id. at 716–17.

225

Id. at 717–18.

226

McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 837.

Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1192–93 (9th
Cir. 2005) rev’d, 551 U.S. 701, vacated, 498 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2007); McFarland v. Jefferson Cty.
Pub. Schs., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), rev’d, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701.
227

228

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711.
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A. The Voices Of The Majority And Plurality Justices
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion 229 emphasizing strict
scrutiny as the standard of review for all racial classifications that either distribute
benefits or burden individuals.230 He was particularly concerned that, without
strict judicial oversight, race could be potently damaging.231 Citing Gratz, Roberts
pointed out that all racial classifications are “simply too pernicious” not to face
strict scrutiny.232
The Court’s opinion highlighted remedying past intentional discrimination233
and diversity in higher education—recognized in Grutter 234—as two compelling
interests for using racial classifications.235 The Court stated that a diversity interest
is compelling only if race is merely a plus factor, as in Grutter.236 Once again,
embracing Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion, the Court noted that compelling
diversity is not “simple ethnic diversity” or racial quotas.237 A plurality of Justices
(consisting of Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas) who
provided four of the votes for the Court opinion limited diversity as a compelling
interest to the higher education context.238 The plurality described “sufficient

Id. at 708. Justices Alito, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts constituted
the majority.
229

230

Id. at 720.

231

Id.

232

Id.

233

Id. (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992)).

234

Id. at 722.

The plurality—Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts—stressed that
remedy of past societal discrimination does not constitute a compelling interest. Id. at 731–32.
235

236

Id.

Id. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324–25 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cali. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 –15 (1978)).
237

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 722, 724–25. The dissenting Justices—Ginsburg, Souter,
Stevens, and Breyer—disagreed, stating that it was important to extend diversity as a compelling
interest to K–12 education since that is where education and development of values begins. Id. at
842 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissenters explained:
238

In light of this Court’s conclusions in Grutter, the compelling nature of these
interests in the context of primary and secondary public education follows here a
fortiori. Primary and secondary schools are where the education of this Nation’s
children begins, where each of us begins to absorb those values we carry with us to the
end of our days. As Justice Marshall said, unless our children begin to learn together,
there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live together. Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
And it was Brown, after all, focusing upon primary and secondary schools, not
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), focusing on law schools, or McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U.S. 637 (1950), focusing on graduate
schools, that affected so deeply not only Americans but the world.
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diversity” as diversity that helps “students see fellow students as individuals rather
than solely as members of a racial group.”239 Justice Kennedy, providing the fifth
vote, opined in the 5–4 Court decision that diversity could also be a compelling
interest in K–12 education.240 Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality that racial
imbalance alone does not violate the Constitution.241 The Court found that Seattle
had no compelling interest in remedying past intentional discrimination, never
having been segregated nor subjected to a court ordered desegregation decree.242
JCPS had no compelling interest in remedying past intentional discrimination
because it achieved unitary status.243
In its narrow tailoring review, the Court held that a narrowly tailored plan
must allow for individualized consideration of applicants, with race merely
constituting “part of a broader assessment of diversity” for each applicant.244
The Court explained that such consideration of applicants must be “highly
individualized” and entail a “holistic review” of the applicant’s credentials with
race being only a component of the review.245 The Court determined that the
JCPS and Seattle plans were not narrowly tailored because race was dispositive
rather than merely a plus factor.246
Furthermore, the Court ruled that narrowly tailored plans do not use a
“limited notion of diversity” such as “viewing race exclusively in white/nonwhite
terms in Seattle and black/‘other’ terms in Jefferson County.”247 The Court
Id. at 842 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); id. at 865 (“Just as diversity in higher
education was deemed compelling in Grutter, diversity in public primary and secondary schools—
where there is even more to gain—must be, a fortiori, a compelling state interest.”). See also id. at
855 (poignantly stating that “I have explained why I do not believe the Constitution could possibly
find ‘compelling’ the provision of a racially diverse education for a 23–year–old law student but not
for a 13–year–old high school pupil.”).
239

Id. at 733.

Id. at 790–91, 787–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See id. at 788 (“In the administration
of public schools by the state and local authorities it is permissible to consider the racial makeup
of schools and to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which
is its racial composition.”). See also id. at 787–88 (“The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the
legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their
race.”); id. at 791 (“At the same time, these compelling interests, in my view, do help inform the
present inquiry. And to the extent the plurality opinion can be interpreted to foreclose consideration
of these interests, I disagree with that reasoning.”).
240

241

Id. at 721.

242

Id. at 720.

243

Id. at 721.

244

Id. at 722–23 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003)).

245

Id. at 723 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337).

Id. (“The districts argue that other factors, such as student preferences, affect assignment
decisions under their plans, but under each plan when race comes into play, it is decisive by itself. It
is not simply one factor weighed with others in reaching a decision, as in Grutter; it is the factor.”).
246

247

Id.
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indicated that “[w]e are a Nation not of black and white alone, but one teeming
with divergent communities knitted together by various traditions.”248 Thus,
schools must broaden the racial categories used in their race-conscious plans to
pass narrow tailoring scrutiny.249
The plurality opinion also sheds light on the Supreme Court Justices overall
approach to narrow tailoring. The plurality opinion made clear that even if JCPS
and Seattle had compelling interests, the plans would still fail narrow tailoring
review.250 Grutter’s narrow tailoring analysis, while stringent, afforded some
flexibility and discretion through its good faith reliance on educators’ expertise.251
The plurality did not embrace the Grutter level of discretion and flexibility.252
Indeed, the plurality characterized JCPS and Seattle’s race-conscious plans as
“extreme,”253 revealing the plurality’s very unfavorable disposition toward raceconscious measures. The plurality’s opposition to deference for schools is evident
in the following statement: “Justice Breyer repeatedly urges deference to local
school boards on these issues. Such deference is fundamentally at odds with our
equal protection jurisprudence.”254
Id. at 723–24 (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
248

249

Id.

250

Id. at 726.

251

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335, 339 (2003).

While the plurality did quote the Grutter Court’s language about “serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives,” as evident herein in the discussion of the
plurality’s Parents Involved opinion, the plurality effectively paid lip service to the deference implied
in good faith. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 735 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339). While the
plurality required that schools must be able to present evidence that there was “serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives” prior to adopting a race-conscious plan, id. at
735, the dissenters saw no such documentation requirement in case law:
252

Seattle school officials concentrated on diminishing the racial component of
their districts’ plan, but did not pursue eliminating that element entirely. For the
Court now to insist as it does, ante, at 2760 – 2761, that these school districts ought
to have said so officially is either to ask for the superfluous (if they need only make
explicit what is implicit) or to demand the impossible (if they must somehow provide
more proof that there is no hypothetical other plan that could work as well as theirs).
I am not aware of any case in which this Court has read the “narrow tailoring” test
to impose such a requirement. Cf. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Ed. School
Dist. No. 205, 961 F.2d 1335, 1338 (C.A.7 1992) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Would it be
necessary to adjudicate the obvious before adopting (or permitting the parties to agree
on) a remedy . . . ?”).
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 850 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
253

Id. at 728 (plurality opinion).

Id. at 744 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). According to
Justice Breyer, on behalf of the dissenting Justices, the plurality was wrong. See id. at 834 (Stevens,
J. dissenting) (“the plurality parts company from this Court’s prior cases, and it takes from local
government the longstanding legal right to use race-conscious criteria for inclusive purposes in
limited ways” (emphasis added)).
254
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The plurality found neither the design nor the operation of JCPS and Seattle’s
plans narrowly tailored because they were tied to “specific racial demographics,
rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to obtain the
asserted educational benefits.”255 The Court disapproved of JCPS’ plan seeking
black enrollment between 15% and 50% of the school population, and Seattle’s
plan for a school racial composition within 10% of the district’s overall white/
nonwhite racial demographics.256 According to the plurality, the school or district’s
racial demographics should not “drive” the required diversity.257 Moreover, a
school should not “count back from its applicant pool to arrive at the meaningful
number” it deems necessary for student diversity.258
The plurality’s strong characterization of any plan involving “working
backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance”259 as a “fatal flaw”260 reveals
the coup de grace against race-conscious plans face with the plurality. The plurality
repeatedly clarified that plans involving racial balancing will fail the plurality’s
narrow tailoring review.261 The plurality’s extreme pessimism in racial balancing
as a compelling interest infiltrating American society echoes a speculative fear,
yet one strong enough to inspire the plurality’s resistance to racial balancing.262
This pessimism feeds into a fear of many in our nation that we would become
a nation that operates on race consciousness rather than race neutrality. Indeed,
the plurality appears to believe that plans using racial balancing will slow the

255

Id. at 726 (plurality opinion).

256

Id.

Id. at 726–27. If the school can document that “the level of racial diversity necessary to
achieve the asserted educational benefits” just “happens to coincide” with racial demographics, this
might help in a narrow tailoring argument to the plurality. Id. at 727.
257

258

Id. at 729.

259

Id.

260

Id. (emphasis added).

See, e.g., id. at 729–30 (“We have many times over reaffirmed that [r]acial balance is not to
be achieved for its own sake.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Freeman
v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)); Richard v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989); Regents
of Univ. of Cali. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)). See also id. at 730
(“outright racial balancing is patently unconstitutional.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003)); id.at 732 (“The principle that racial balancing is
not permitted is one of substance, not semantics. Racial balancing is not transformed from patently
unconstitutional to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it racial diversity. While the
school districts use various verbal formulations to describe the interest they seek to promote—racial
diversity, avoidance of racial isolation, racial integration—they offer no definition of the interest
that suggests it differs from racial balance.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Justice Kennedy evidently does not agree that avoidance of racial isolation is not a compelling
interest in avoiding racial isolation. See id. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“A compelling interest
exists in avoiding racial isolation.”).
261

262

Id. at 730 (plurality opnion).
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transition to a post-racial, colorblind America.263 This fear is heightened by the
fact that “racial balancing has no logical stopping point.”264
The unconstitutionality of racial balancing and the constitutionality of
individualized consideration of applicants are not the only significant principles
the Court articulated. The Court also elaborated on the “minimal-effect”
principle.265 Under this principle, race-conscious plans must have more than a
“minimal effect” on student assignments for the plan to be narrowly tailored.266
A plan having only “minimal effect” on student assignments indicates that other
more effective means are available for the school to achieve its diversity goal.267
Based on this “minimal-effect” principle, the Court explained that Seattle’s plan
only moved a “small number of students between schools;”268 consequently, the
plan was not narrowly tailored. As for JCPS, the district’s race-conscious plan only
impacted 3% of student assignments, thereby having “only a minimal effect on
the assignment of students.”269
The irony of this “minimal-effect” view of narrow tailoring is that the
plurality opinion had expressed strong opposition to reliance on numbers.270
Yet, the “minimal-effect” analysis argues that race-conscious plans and numbers

263
See, e.g., id. at 730–31 (“Allowing racial balancing as a compelling end in itself would
‘effectively assur[e] that race will always be relevant in American life, and that the ‘ultimate goal’ of
‘eliminating entirely from governmental decision making such irrelevant factors as a human being’s
race’ will never be achieved.” (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 495 (plurality opinion of O’Connor,
J.); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 547 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). See also id. at 731 (“An interest linked
to nothing other than proportional representation of various races . . . would support indefinite use
of racial classifications, employed first to obtain the appropriate mixture of racial views and then
to ensure that the [program] continues to reflect that mixture.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 614 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
Cf. David Brown, Adam Jones: Banana Thrown His Way At AT&T Park, Big League Stew, Aug.
12, 2013 (characterizing post-racial America as “a fairytale until further notice.”).
264
Id. at 731 (internal cites omitted) (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 498; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275
(plurality opinion)). It also appears that the plurality views benign classifications as generational
fads. Id. at 742. This attitude is another reason why the plurality’s resistance to race-conscious plans
should not be surprising.
265

Id. at 733.

Id.; see also id. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s agreement
with this).
266

267

Id. at 733.

268

Id.

Id. at 734. The Court further relied on JCPS’ statement that “the racial guidelines have
minimal impact in this process, because they mostly influence student assignment in subtle and
indirect ways.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
269

270

Id. at 726–28.
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must play a greater role in student assignments.271 This is very confusing for
schools; however, obfuscation might be another way in which the Court seeks to
undermine school’s ability to satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement. After all, the
four Justices in the plurality stated that “[i]f the need for the racial classifications
embraced by the school districts is unclear, even on the districts’ own terms,
the costs are undeniable.”272 Further obfuscating the narrow tailoring riddle for
schools, the Court declared: “While we do not suggest that greater use of race
would be preferable, the minimal impact of the districts’ racial classifications on
school enrollment casts doubt on the necessity of using racial classifications.”273
A final aspect of the plurality’s narrow tailoring approach involves evaluation
of race-neutral plans. The plurality stressed that to pass narrow tailoring muster,
schools must present evidence that they considered race-neutral plans before
implementing race-conscious plans.274 The Court found that both JCPS and
Seattle failed to present any evidence that they considered any race-neutral plans

271

Id. at 733. See also id. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

272

Id. at 745 (emphasis added).

Id. at 734. The plurality of Justices conflated invidious racial discrimination which existed
before Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), with JCPS and Seattle’s benign use of
race. See id. at 747–48 (plurality opinion) (“Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could
and could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these cases have
not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once again—even for very
different reasons.” (emphasis added)). The word “this” as well as the phrase “once again” shows the
conflation. Further, Chief Justice Roberts stated for the plurality, “The way to stop discrimination
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” Id. at 748. Justice Kennedy chided
the plurality for this statement, noting that it was too simplistic a view of race-conscious measures
and educational equality. Id. at 788. (Kennedy, J., concurring). He noted reality after 50 years of
Brown affirms that this view was simplistic. Id. Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion to express
his dismay at statements like this from Chief Justice Roberts that essentially failed to acknowledge
the distinction between benign and invidious discrimination. Justice Stevens responded:
273

The first sentence in the concluding paragraph of his opinion states: “Before Brown,
schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go to school based on
the color of their skin.” This sentence reminds me of Anatole France’s observation:
“[T]he majestic equality of the la[w], . . . forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under
the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.” THE CHIEF JUSTICE
fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the
history books do not tell stories of white children struggling to attend black schools.
Id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Justice
Stevens accused the Chief Justice of rewriting history. Id. He stated that inclusive uses of race is
“fundamentally different” from inclusive uses of race. Id. at 799 & n.3. Justice Stevens warned that
the Court’s rigidity “obscures Brown’s clear message.” Id. at 801. He stated that “[t]he Court’s misuse
of the three-tiered approach to equal protection analysis merely reconfirms my own view that there
is only one such Clause in the Constitution.” Id. at 800.
274

Id. at 735.
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before they chose their race-conscious plans.275 Consequently, their plans were not
narrowly tailored.276
Despite his vote with the Court and the plurality, Justice Thomas voiced
stronger opposition to race-conscious measures than his colleagues. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Thomas immediately evinced his attitude toward
race-conscious measures, characterizing such measures as an “experiment.”277 He
also referred to race-conscious plans as “coerced” and “forced racial mixing.”278
This is not surprising since Justice Thomas advocates a colorblind view of the
Constitution.279 The colorblind view sees no color and consequently no premise
for addressing issues on the basis of race.280 Instead people are simply individual
humans in one human race.281 Civil rights scholar Zoe Burkholder notes that,
“[n]o matter how it is constructed, the colorblind ideal masks institutionalized
racism in America.”282
Under this colorblind view, Justice Thomas regards benign uses of race as the
moral equivalent of legal segregation before Brown v. Board of Education, calling
both approaches “wrong.”283 Advancing this equivalency argument, he opined
that “[w]hat was wrong in 1954 cannot be right today.”284 He declared that the

275

Id.

276

Id.

277

Id. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring).

278

Id. at 761, 764.

279

Id. at 772, 780–81.

See generally Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism And The Colorblind Constitution, 89
Notre Dame L. Rev. 71 (2013); Randall Kennedy, Colorblind Constitutionalism, 82 Fordham L.
Rev. 1 (2013); Osagie K. Obasogie, Can The Blind Lead The Blind? Rethinking Equal Protection
Jurisprudence Through An Empirical Examination Of Blind People’s Understanding Of Race, 15 U. Pa.
J. Const. L. 705 (2013).
280

281
See generally Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism And The Colorblind Constitution, 89
Notre Dame L. Rev. 71 (2013); Randall Kennedy, Colorblind Constitutionalism, 82 Fordham L.
Rev. 1 (2013); Osagie K. Obasogie, Can The Blind Lead The Blind? Rethinking Equal Protection
Jurisprudence Through An Empirical Examination Of Blind People’s Understanding Of Race, 15 U. Pa.
J. Const. L. 705 (2013).
282
See Zoe Burkholder, Color in the Classroom: How American Schools taught Race
1900 –1954 178 (2011).
283
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring). The dissenting Justices—
Souter, Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg—disagreed. Id. at 829–30. They explained that

[t]here is reason to believe that those who drafted an Amendment with this basic
purpose in mind would have understood the legal and practical difference between
the use of race-conscious criteria in defiance of that purpose, namely to keep the races
apart, and the use of race-conscious criteria to further that purpose, namely to bring
the races together.
Id. at 829 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
284

Id. at 778 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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government’s beneficial use of race, not unlike the invidious use of race, “demeans
us all.”285 According to Justice Thomas, benign use of race is “racial paternalism”
and is “as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination.”286
Justice Thomas continued his moral equivalency argument stating that “[t]he
constitutional problems with government race-based decision making are not
diminished in the slightest by the presence or absence of an intent to oppress
any race or by the real or asserted well-meaning motives for the race-based
decisionmaking.”287 Race-conscious student assignment is “precisely the sort of
government action that pits the races against one another, exacerbates racial
tension, and provokes resentment among those who believe that they have been
wronged by the government’s use of race.”288 Additionally, “benign race-based
decisionmaking suffers the same constitutional infirmity as invidious race-based
decisionmaking.”289 Failure to acknowledge a moral distinction between the
beneficial use of race and the invidious use of race seems troubling.
Justice Thomas continued his opposition to race-conscious measures by
dismissing Justice Breyer’s fears of school resegregation as a “mere incantation of
terms”290 and a disguise to equate racial imbalance with segregation.291 According
to Justice Thomas, the term “segregation” should be reserved for the “deliberate
operation of a school system to carry out a governmental policy to separate pupils
in schools solely on the basis of race.”292 On the other hand, the term “racial
imbalance” refers to the “failure of a school district’s individual schools to match
or approximate the demographic makeup of the student population at large.”293
Justice Thomas appears to acquiesce with the government failing to address racial
imbalance, even though he acknowledged the “danger of racial imbalance” in

285

Id. at 752.

286

Id. at 759.

287

Id. at 758 (emphasis added).

288

Id. at 759 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).

Id. at 758 (emphasis added). See also id. at 780 (“In place of the colorblind Constitution, the
dissent would permit measures to keep the races together and proscribe measures to keep the races
apart. Although no such distinction is apparent in the Fourteenth Amendment, the dissent would
constitutionalize today’s faddish social theories that embrace that distinction. The Constitution is
not that malleable.”) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)).
289

Id. at 749; see also id. at 750 (“To raise the specter of resegregation to defend these programs
is to ignore the meaning of the word and the nature of the cases before us.”).
290

Id. at 749. He specifically stated that “[r]acial imbalance is not segregation.” Id. at 750. He
opined that “racial imbalance is not inevitably linked to unconstitutional segregation.” Id.
291

292
Id. at 749 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Swann v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971); Monroe v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Jackson, 391 U.S. 450, 452 (1968)).
293

Id. at 749 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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JCPS and Seattle and “a national trend toward classroom racial imbalance.”294
In fact, he opposed remedying racial imbalance.295 He explained that racial
imbalance has “no ultimate remedy” because “schools will fall in and out of
balance in the natural course.”296 According to Justice Thomas, race-conscious
measures will consequently continue on an “indefinite basis—a continuous
process with no identifiable culpable party and no discernable end point.”297
Justice Thomas further evidenced his disapproval of race-conscious measures by
opposing any deference to schools. He declared that race-conscious measures are
not constitutionally permissible “simply because a school district . . . proceeds in
good faith with arguably pure motives.”298
Justice Thomas appears willing to set up difficult and even fatal hurdles in the
path of race-conscious measures. For instance, he stated that strict scrutiny “has
proven automatically fatal in most cases.”299 Further, he opined that even with
remedial uses of race, the government has a big hurdle to overcome.300 Additional
hurdles he suggests include requiring the government present a “strong basis in
evidence”301 justifying remedial use of race, and not allowing the government to
rely on “inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs.”302
Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, apparently encouraged or tacitly approved
non-racially-integrated education.303 Such a posture is another hurdle to overcome
because a mindset that sees benefits to non-racially-integrated education might be
relatively intransigent on race-conscious efforts promoting integrated education.
While declaring the social science on the benefits of racially-integrated education
294
Id. at 750. See also id. at 750–51 (“No one contends that Seattle has established or that
Louisville has reestablished a dual school system that separates students on the basis of race. The
statistics cited in Appendix A to the dissent are not to the contrary. At most, those statistics show a
national trend toward classroom racial imbalance. However, racial imbalance without intentional state
action to separate the races does not amount to segregation. To raise the specter of resegregation to
defend these programs is to ignore the meaning of the word and the nature of the cases before us.”)
(emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)).
295

Id. at 749–57.

296

Id. at 756.

297

Id. at 757, 760.

298

Id. at 751.

299

Id. at 752 (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted); id. at 765.

300

Id. at 754–55.

Id. He also called it “sheer speculation” to say that “decades-past” school segregation
impacted employment, economic conditions, housing patterns, and social attitudes that some
argued have furthered de facto school segregation. Id. at 760.
301

Id. at 755 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). See id. (stating that claims of general
societal discrimination “plainly” do not suffice). It is important to note that, like Justice Thomas
and the plurality, see id. at 731, the dissenting Justices did not acknowledge a compelling interest in
remedying general societal discrimination. Id. at 843 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
302

303

Id. at 761–70 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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as disputed,304 Justice Thomas stated as “fact” the positive academic achievement
of black students in “racially-isolated” schools.305 He held up, as examples, fifteen
graduates of Dunbar High School who, over a five-year span, before the Brown
v. Board of Education case received Ivy League degrees.306 Post-Brown, “[t]here
is also evidence that black students attending historically black colleges achieve
better academic results than those attending predominantly white colleges.”307
According to Justice Thomas, Seattle’s African American Academy exemplifies the
benefits of education in a “highly segregated” school.308 The relationship between
race-conscious plans and educational success for black students is “tenuous.”309
The negative impacts of racial imbalance are merely “perceived.”310
The discussions above evince that Justice Thomas—a critical vote for the
coalition that made Parents Involved a 5–4 decision—demands a heavy burden
and high hurdles for all race-conscious plans.311 However, the magnitude of
these hurdles is most vivid in his declaration that only race-conscious plans
designed to serve as a “bulwark against anarchy” or for violence prevention
should be constitutional.312 Overall, the tenor of Justice Thomas’ opinion clearly
demonstrates that he is almost certainly never going to support race-conscious
admissions plans.

B. The Voice of the Fifth Vote
As the fifth vote, and consequently positioning himself as the potential swing
vote on race-conscious plans, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion might be the
litmus test for future race-conscious measures. Kennedy’s narrow tailoring analysis
is especially important as he devoted fifteen pages to discussing narrow tailoring,
compared to only three pages analyzing compelling interest.313
Id. In the dissenting Justices’ response to Justice Thomas, Justice Breyer stated: “If we are to
insist upon unanimity in the social science literature before finding a compelling interest, we might
never find one.” Id. at 845 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
304

305

Id. at 763 (Thomas, J., concurring).

306

Id. (stating that “Dunbar is by no means an isolated example.”).

Id. It is noteworthy that present tense and present continuous tense were used in
this statement.
307

Id. at 764. See also id. at 766 & n.14 (“this Court does not sit to create a society that
includes all Americans or to solve the problems of troubled inner–city schooling.” (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
308

309

Id. at 764.

Id. at 766, 766 n.14. See id. at 770 (“Some studies have even found that a deterioration in
racial attitudes seems to result from racial mixing in schools. Therefore, it is not nearly as apparent
as the dissent suggests that increased interracial exposure automatically leads to improved racial
attitudes or race relations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
310

311

Id. at 771.

312

Id.

He discussed compelling interest on pages 782 to 783, 791 and 797. His narrow tailoring
analysis runs from page 783 to 798.
313
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Justice Kennedy stated that, while the colorblind view is great aspirationally,
“[i]n the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional
principle.”314 While “[t]he enduring hope is that race should not matter; the
reality is that too often it does.”315 We must “recognize and confront the flaws
and injustices that remain.”316 To ensure that racial-inequality flaws and injustices
are not perpetuated, we must apply strict scrutiny to race-conscious plans to
determine whether the plan is remedial or benign.317 Applying strict scrutiny
helps ensure motivation for race-conscious plans is not “simple racial politics”
or “illegitimate notions of racial inferiority.”318 Justice Kennedy’s fear—which
likely resonates with opponents of race-conscious measures—is that if anything
less than traditional strict scrutiny is applied to racial classifications, “widespread
governmental deployment of racial classifications” even outside the educational
context could follow.319
The burden of proof under the strict scrutiny standard for both the compel
ling interest and narrow tailoring prongs falls on school districts.320 The narrow
tailoring burden requires schools to provide a detailed and precise description
of how and when they use an individual student’s race in their decisions.321
The districts must ensure their descriptions322 contain no inconsistencies,
discrepancies, or “competing propositions.”323 Justice Kennedy reasoned that
“ambiguities become all the more problematic in light of the contradictions
and confusions that result.”324 Besides, courts will not interpret ambiguities in
the school’s favor.325 The description of race-conscious plans schools provide to

314

Id. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

315

Id. at 787.

Id. Justice Kennedy chided the plurality for dismissing the government’s role in ensuring
equal opportunity for all races. Id. at 787–88. See also id. at 788 (“The plurality opinion is at least
open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the problem of
de facto resegregation in schooling. I cannot endorse that conclusion. To the extent the plurality
opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities must accept the
status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.”).The dissenting
Justices agreed, noting that “[n]o case of this Court has ever relied upon the de jure/de facto
distinction in order to limit what a school district is voluntarily allowed to do.”) (emphasis added).
316

317

Id. at 783.

318

Id.

Id. at 791. The choice of the word “deployment” in conveying this fear appears
quite interesting.
319

320

Id. at 784.

Id. at 784 –85. See, e.g., id. at 784 (“As part of that burden it must establish, in detail, how
decisions based on an individual student’s race are made in a challenged governmental program.”).
321

322

Id. at 784–86.

323

Id. at 786.

324

Id. at 785.

325

Id. at 786.
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courts must clearly show race is not used in a “far-reaching, inconsistent, and ad
hoc manner.”326
As part of narrow tailoring, race-conscious plans must clearly identify: (i) the
person(s) responsible for making the race-conscious decisions; (ii) the oversight
for decisions under the plan; and (iii) how the plan chooses between two similarlysituated applicants.327 Furthermore, where a school district is racially diverse, its
race-conscious plan must not use “crude racial categories” such as white/non-white
or black/“other.”328 If using crude racial categories, the district must fully justify
why, despite the diversity of races in the district, its plan chose only a limited
number of racial categories.329 For example, the district must “explain how, in
the context of its diverse student population, a blunt distinction between ‘white’
and ‘non-white’” promotes the compelling interest(s) asserted by the district.330
Furthermore, the explanation must be “convincing.”331 Ultimately, the district
would be wise to use a variety of racial categories reflective of the diverse races in
the district.332
To pass muster, narrowly tailored plans must address diversity without typing
each student individually and systemically solely by race.333 Individual typing by

326

Id.

327

Id. at 785.

Id. at 786. Justice Kennedy, as well as the plurality, found problematic in Seattle’s crude
categories the fact that “a school with 50 percent Asian–American students and 50 percent white
students but no African–American, Native–American, or Latino students would qualify as balanced,
while a school with 30 percent Asian–American, 25 percent African–American, 25 percent Latino,
and 20 percent white students would not.” Id. at 724, 787. Justice Breyer, countered for the
dissenting Justices by stating that the majority’s critique implied a greater, rather than lesser, use
of race. Id. at 854 (Breyer, J., dissenting opinion). (“The majority suggests that Seattle’s classification system could permit a school to be labeled ‘diverse’ with a 50% Asian–American and 50%
white student body, and no African–American students, Hispanic students, or students of other
ethnicity . . . . Seattle has been able to achieve a desirable degree of diversity without the greater
emphasis on race that drawing fine lines among minority groups would require.”) (internal citations
omitted). See id. (“the plurality cannot object that the constitutional defect is the individualized use
of race and simultaneously object that not enough account of individuals’ race has been taken.”).
328

329

Id. at 786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Id. at 787. In other words, it must be clear that the district’s classification system is not an
“ill fit” for its compelling interest. Id.
330

331

Id.

332

Id. at 786–87.

Id. at 788–89. It is important to recognize that Justice Kennedy clearly stated that schools
can address their concerns about their “student-body compositions.” See id. (“If school authorities
are concerned that the student-body compositions of certain schools interfere with the objective of
offering an equal educational opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise race-conscious
measures to address the problem in a general way and without treating each student in different
fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race.”) (emphasis added).
333
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race reduces “an individual to an assigned racial identity for differential treatment
[and] is among the most pernicious actions our government can undertake.”334
Race-conscious measures typing individual students solely by race must be a “last
resort” for pursuing a compelling interest.335 Justice Kennedy believed JCPS and
Seattle’s plans individually typed students by race.336 Specifically, he characterized
the plans as “explicit, sweeping, classwide racial classifications”337 and opined that
the Gratz plan had “much less reliance on race” than JCPS and Seattle’s plans.338
And unlike Grutter, Seattle’s plan was based on a “mechanical formula” using
“three rigid criteria”—race, sibling placement, and school distance.339
According to Justice Kennedy, plans typing individuals by race require a
governmental definition of each individual’s race,340 consequently forcing the
individual “to live under a state-mandated racial label.”341 Such a label weakens
the individual, undermining his or her dignity.342 Plans individually typing by race
result in “corrosive discourse” and make race a “bargaining chip in the political
process.”343 Such plans are “crude” and “threaten to reduce children to racial chits
valued and traded according to one school’s supply and another’s demand,”344
creating “new divisiveness.”345 Viewed in these terms, most people likely find it
highly objectionable and degrading picturing their kids diminished to racial chits
used in supply and demand transactions.
In his narrow tailoring analysis, Justice Kennedy embraced race-conscious
measures in which race is merely a plus factor for admission; this is “a more
nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and student characteristics that
334
Id. at 795. He also pointed to the contentiousness and divisiveness of assigning benefits or
burdens based on race. Id. at 795, 797. He conceded that “[n]otwithstanding these concerns,” the
Court had indeed approved of race-based programs in the past that entailed individual typing by
race. Id. at 795–96.

Id. at 790. See also id. at 798 (“measures other than differential treatment based on racial
typing of individuals first must be exhausted”).
335

336

Id. at 790–98.

337

Id. at 790.

Id. at 791 (emphasis added). See also id. at 792 (“If Gratz is to be the measure, the racial
classification systems here are a fortiori invalid . . . . Under no fair reading, though, can the majority
opinion in Gratz be cited as authority to sustain the racial classifications under consideration here.”).
338

339

Id. at 793 (emphasis added).

340

Id. at 793, 795, 797.

341

Id. (emphasis added).

342

Id.

343

Id.

344

Id. at 798 (emphasis added).

Id. at 797 (emphasis added). A new divisiveness implies there was an old divisiveness which
could be a reference to the divisiveness that occurred in the time of de jure racial segregation in our
nation. The mere fact that he suggests that there might be new divisiveness might be reminder of
the old divisiveness which might distress and indeed panic a lot of people.
345
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might include race as a component.”346 While Grutter informed schools to use a
plus-factor approach in K–12, the other factors for consideration vary based on the
students’ age, the role of the school, and the parents’ needs.347 Additionally, “other
demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered.”348
Justice Kennedy provided examples 349 of race-conscious plans which might
not merit strict scrutiny because they do not type individual students by race:
(i) strategic choice of sites for construction of new schools;350 (ii) creating attend
ance zones while being generally conscious of neighborhood demographics;351
(iii) resource allocation for special programs such as magnet schools;352 (iv) targeted
recruitment of faculty and students;353 and (v) tracking race-based statistics,
including enrollment and performance numbers.354 These are examples of raceconscious measures that generally (as opposed to individually) type students by
race and are thus considered narrowly tailored. Schools should be able to use
“facially race-neutral”355 policies and procedures like these with “confidence”
and “candor”356 as they do not present the pressing dangers of a race-conscious
plan that individually types by race.357 Schools should consult experts, concerned
citizens, parents, and administrators to find other narrowly tailored examples of
implementing the compelling interest in diversity.358
Justice Kennedy stated that narrow tailoring forecloses blind judicial deference
to school districts.359 Since Justice Kennedy appears unwilling to defer to district’s
plans under narrow tailoring analysis, districts must be fully prepared to explain
the means-end fit using Justice Kennedy’s identified narrow tailoring principles.
346
Id. at 788, 790. See id. at 793 (“If those students were considered for a whole range of their
talents and school needs with race as just one consideration, Grutter would have some application.”).
347

Id. at 790.

348

Id. at 798.

Justice Kennedy characterizes these examples as facially race-neutral. See id. at 790 (“the
facially race-neutral means set forth above.”). For an excellent critique of these examples, see Justice
Breyer’s dissent. Id. at 852 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
349

350

Id. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

351

Id.

352

Id. See id. at 852 (identifying an example of these special programs as magnet schools).

353

Id. at 789.

354

Id.

355

Id. at 790.

356

Id. at 789.

357

Id. at 797.

358

Id. at 798.

Id. at 790 (“The history of racial classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial
deference to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection
analysis.” (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989))). The critical word to
look at here is the word “necessity” which is a reference to narrow tailoring.
359
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Even with Justice Kennedy apparently endorsing diversity as a compelling
K–12 interest, his narrow tailoring view disfavors race-conscious measures.360
Consequently, the school districts’ enthusiasm about Justice Kennedy’s support for
diversity as a compelling interest must be quickly tempered by the reality that he
encumbers race-conscious plans through stringent narrow tailoring requirements.
Justice Kennedy’s unwillingness to defer to school districts, implies that he
expects the judiciary to have a full understanding of the nuances of race-conscious
plans that would enable the court to make the best decision for the district.
However, one must question whether the court actually has the institutional
capacity to make more competent decisions than the schools:
Justice Kennedy acknowledges that narrow tailoring analysis
requires the Court to understand the scope and availability of
less restrictive alternatives. Such an inquiry also requires in many
cases a thorough understanding of how a plan works. According
to Kennedy, the Jefferson County Board of Education failed to
meet this mandate. One might question, however, whether the
judiciary has the institutional capacity to thoroughly understand
whether and how alternative policies might be used.361
The plurality and Justice Kennedy’s reasonings logically lead to the question:
for the five Justices, what is the path moving forward for race-conscious measures?
A majority of the Supreme Court requires schools first exhaust all workable raceneutral alternatives before considering race-conscious measures.362 Justice Kennedy
expressed optimism in schools achieving compelling interest in diversity or
avoiding use of racial isolation through race-conscious measures that generally type
Justice Kennedy also emphasized that the distinction between de facto segregation which
allows for limited remedies and de jure segregation which allows for broader remedies must not be
minimized. Id. at 793–97. (Kennedy, J., concurring). He said this, despite acknowledging that:
360

From the standpoint of the victim, it is true, an injury stemming from racial prejudice
can hurt as much when the demeaning treatment based on race identity stems
from bias masked deep within the social order as when it is imposed by law. The
distinc-tion between government and private action, furthermore, can be amorphous
both as a historical matter and as a matter of present-day finding of fact. Laws arise
from a culture and vice versa. Neither can assign to the other all responsibility for
persisting injustices.
Id. at 795.
According to the dissenting Justices—Breyer, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter—the distinction
was “meaningless in the present context, thereby dooming the plurality’s endeavor to find support
for its views in that distinction.” Id. at 806 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For more of the dissenters’ view
on this distinction, see id. at 844 (“that distinction concerns what the Constitution requires school
boards to do, not what it permits them to do”).
361
Lia Epperson, Equality Dissonance: Jurisprudential Limitations And Legislative Opportunities,
7 Stan. J. Civ. Rts. & Civ. Liberties 213, 227–28 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
362

See supra Part III.A.
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students by race (i.e., plans using supposed proxies for race such as socioeconomic
status).363 Such generalized typing plans are essentially furtive colorblindness.
Justice Kennedy does not think such measures merit strict scrutiny; thus he might
join a potential core of four dissenting Justices on the Court and uphold such
measures.364 In fact, such measures could attract rational-basis review.365 However,
the plans that are usually challenged individually typed by race, thus meriting
strict scrutiny analysis according to at least five Justices.366 In other words, the fifth
vote, Justice Kennedy’s, is vitally important to determine what level of scrutiny
will be applied, ultimately sealing the fate of school plans. Sadly, “[t]he blunt force
of Kennedy’s narrow tailoring analysis ultimately saturates his idealism”367 and
portends a grim future for race-conscious plans.
The 2013 George Zimmerman trial reminds us that race is still a hot-button
issue in America.368 Given the persistent anxieties and thorniness surrounding
issues of race, any expectation of public outcry to relax the strictures of narrow
tailoring in judicial review of race-conscious measures would be a pipedream.
Even Justice Kennedy, who eagerly embraces diversity as a compelling interest, is
not eager to ease narrow tailoring on race-conscious measures.369

363

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788–91 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

For a great discussion of how Justices Sotomayor and Kagan might lean on race-conscious
measures, see Brandon Paradise, Racially Transcendent Diversity, 50 U. Louisville L. Rev. 415,
478–81 (2012). Professor Paradise suggests that both Justices Kagan and Sotomayor might be
sympathetic to use of race-conscious measures. Id.
364

365
Since Justice Kennedy stated that they would not attract strict scrutiny, the next logical
applicable standard of review is rational basis (since gender or illegitimacy is not involved, inter
mediate scrutiny is inapplicable).
366
These Justices are Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, Alito, and Kennedy. Recall, when
individual typing is used, the Court also expects race-conscious plans to be a non-mechanical (i.e.
flexible) plan in which race is merely a plus factor. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 793
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (opinion of Powell, J.).
367

Epperson, supra note 361, at 227.

See, e.g., Paul Lewis, George Zimmerman Acquittal Stirs Resentment And Renews Race Debate,
The Guardian (July 19, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/19/martin-lutherking-george-zimmerman-race (discussing the acquittal of George Zimmerman of the charge of
second-degree murder of Trayvon Martin and the attendant racial tensions); Megan Gannon, Wide
Racial Gap in Reaction to Zimmerman Verdict, LiveScience (July 19, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/
wide-racial-gap-reaction-zimmerman-verdict-112952910.html (discussing the large racial divide in
the reaction to the Zimmerman acquittal).
368

Justice Kennedy did say that “[t]he decision today should not prevent school districts
from continuing the important work of bringing together students of different racial, ethnic, and
economic backgrounds.” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring). And he did
say that “[a] compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district,
in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue.” Id. at 797 (emphasis added). However, as
evident above, his narrow tailoring analysis presents stringent hurdles for districts to overcome.
369
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C. We Dissent
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens would have upheld JCPS
and Seattle’s voluntary race-conscious plans, given their fervent support for such
plans.370 Indeed, the Justices stated that “the Constitution cannot plausibly be
interpreted to rule out categorically all local efforts to use means that are conscious
of the race of individuals.”371 The dissent compared JCPS and Seattle’s plans to
authorized racial-integration efforts and even went so far as to urge communities
to undertake race-conscious measures.372 The Justices stated that race-conscious
measures are “efforts that this Court has repeatedly required, permitted, and
encouraged local authorities to undertake [because] [t]his Court has recognized
that the public interests at stake in such cases are compelling.”373
The dissenting opinion described voluntary race-conscious measures as
“measures that the Constitution permitted, but did not require.”374 It noted that
the Court has a history of deferring to schools’ discretion on “how to achieve

370

Id. at 803–68, 837 (Breyer, J., dissenting opinion).

371

Id. at 806 (internal quotation marks omitted).

372

Id. at 803, 806. Additionally, the dissent stated that
[t]he plurality pays inadequate attention to this law, to past opinions’ rationales, their
language, and the contexts in which they arise. As a result, it reverses course and
reaches the wrong conclusion. In doing so, it distorts precedent, it misapplies the
relevant constitutional principles, it announces legal rules that will obstruct efforts
by state and local governments to deal effectively with the growing resegregation of
public schools.

Id. at 803.
373

Id. at 803 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Id. at 804, 824–30. See id. at 823 (“A longstanding and unbroken line of legal authority
tells us that the Equal Protection Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to
achieve positive race-related goals, even when the Constitution does not compel it.”). This permission
granted to school districts includes broad discretionary authority to design race-conscious measures:
374

North Carolina Bd. of Ed. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971), this Court, citing
Swann, restated the point. [S]chool authorities, the Court said, have wide discretion in
formulating school policy, and . . . as a matter of educational policy school authorities
may well conclude that some kind of racial balance in the schools is desirable quite
apart from any constitutional requirements. Then–Justice Rehnquist echoed this view
in Bustop, Inc. v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., 439 U.S. 1380, 1383 (1978) (opinion in
chambers), making clear that he too believed that Swann’s statement reflected settled
law: ‘While I have the gravest doubts that [a state supreme court] was required by
the United States Constitution to take the [desegregation] action that it has taken in
this case, I have very little doubt that it was permitted by that Constitution to take
such action.’ These statements nowhere suggest that this freedom is limited to school
districts where court-ordered desegregation measures are also in effect.
Id. at 823–24 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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integration.”375 Such discretion is critical because of the highly complex nature of
decisions that school districts make.376 Therefore, it is important to give districts
the opportunity to work with a “broad range of choices” of race-conscious
“means.”377 Besides, increased discretion would not make districts unaccountable
as they answer to the electorate.378 Even as Justice Breyer adjured his colleagues to
defer to schools, with respect to narrow tailoring, he warned: “I shall not accept
the school boards’ assurances on faith.”379 This seeming inconsistency is resolved
by fact that, while Justice Breyer and the dissenters advocate deference, they still
believe courts must apply strict scrutiny analysis when reviewing cases; however,
they advocate a more lenient scrutiny.380 This scrutiny is still rigorous review,381 just
not as rigorous as traditional strict scrutiny. As Justice Breyer explained, “giving
some degree of weight to a local school board’s knowledge, expertise, and concerns
in these particular matters is not inconsistent with rigorous judicial scrutiny. It
simply recognizes judges are not well suited to act as school administrators.”382
375
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 804 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 863 (“Until today, this
Court understood the Constitution as affording the people, acting through their elected
representatives, freedom to select the use of ‘race-conscious’ criteria from among their available
options. Today, however, the Court restricts (and some Members would eliminate) that leeway.”
(internal citations omitted)).
376

Id. at 822.

Id. See id. at 845 (“the Constitution allows democratically elected school boards to make up
their own minds as to how best to include people of all races in one America.” (emphasis added)).
377

378
Id. at 836. See also id. at 839 (“evidence supporting an educational interest in racially
integrated schools is well established and strong enough to permit a democratically elected school
board reasonably to determine that this interest is a compelling one”). The dissent’s push for
deference to schools is further evident in the following:

The plurality, or at least those who follow Justice Thomas’ “ ‘color-blind’ ” approach,
may feel confident that, to end invidious discrimination, one must end all
governmental use of race-conscious criteria including those with inclusive objectives.
By way of contrast, I do not claim to know how best to stop harmful discrimination;
how best to create a society that includes all Americans; how best to overcome our
serious problems of increasing de facto segregation, troubled inner-city schooling, and
poverty correlated with race. But, as a judge, I do know that the Constitution does
not authorize judges to dictate solutions to these problems. Rather, the Constitution
creates a democratic political system through which the people themselves must
together find answers. And it is for them to debate how best to educate the Nation’s
children and how best to administer America’s schools to achieve that aim. The
Court should leave them to their work. And it is for them to decide, to quote the
plurality’s slogan, whether the best way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is
to stop discriminating on the basis of race. That is why the Equal Protection Clause
outlaws invidious discrimination, but does not similarly forbid all use of raceconscious criteria.
Id. at 862–63 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
379

Id. at 846.

380

Id. at 832–34 (discussing needs for a more lenient strict-scrutiny review for inclusive uses

of race).
381

Id. at 848.

382

Id. at 848–49 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The Justices opined that the majority should have deferred to JCPS and
Seattle’s plans because those plans were not as race-conscious as other plans
the Court previously approved as narrowly tailored.383 For instance, JCPS and
Seattle’s plans did not present the burdens accompanying mandatory busing in
the school-busing era,384 and both plans relied on race in “limited and gradually
diminishing ways.”385 Indeed, the plans did “not impose burdens unfairly upon
members of one race alone but instead [sought] benefits for members of all
races alike.”386
Continuing its theme of deference to schools, Justice Breyer opined that
JCPS and Seattle’s plans’ compelling interests were narrowly tailored under “any
reasonable definition of those terms.”387 He observed that, in prior precedent,
the Court empowered districts to make judgment calls about the need to have a
“prescribed ratio” of white and black students “reflecting the proportion for the
district as a whole.”388 This racial balancing is “an educational policy . . . within
the broad discretionary powers of school authorities.”389
The dissenting Justices view racial diversity, racial balancing, racial integration, elimination/avoidance of racial isolation, and increasing racial mixtures of
schools (and of each student’s school experience) as synonymous concepts all falling
under one, single compelling interest.390 This single compelling interest consists of
three elements: (i) remedial; (ii) educational; and (iii) democratic.391 The remedial
element allows districts to remedy lingering effects of previous segregation and
maintain “hard-won gains.”392 The educational element empowers districts to

383

Id. at 803, 857, 865.

The dissent identified the following as benefits of race-conscious plans such as JCPS and
Seattle’s plans, relative to prior desegregation plans: “district wide commitment to high quality
public schools, increased pupil assignment to neighborhood schools, diminished use of busing,
greater student choice, reduced risk of white flight, and so forth.” Id. at 820. See also id. at 835
(“If one examines the context more specifically, one finds that the districts’ plans reflect efforts
to overcome a history of segregation, embody the results of broad experience and community
consultation, seek to expand student choice while reducing the need for mandatory busing, and use
race-conscious criteria in highly limited ways that diminish the use of race compared to preceding
integration efforts.”).
384

385

Id. at 820.

386

Id. at 835.

387

Id. at 806.

388

Id. at 804 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).

389

Id. at 805 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 16).

390

Id. at 838 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

Id. at 842. The dissent stated that even if there is contrary evidence about the impact of
these elements, the evidence is strong enough in support of the elements that districts should be
given the discretion to decide how to proceed. Id. at 839–41.
391

392

Id. at 839.
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rectify the negative educational impact of students attending heavily segregated
schools by moving them to integrated schools.393 After all, research shows that
when black students are moved from segregated schools to integrated schools,
their academic achievement rises substantially.394 The democratic element allows
districts to produce a school reflecting American pluralism where people play
and work with various races.395 Research supports the importance of pluralism,
showing that both white and black students thrive in interracial friendships,
contact, and socialization when educated in integrated schools.396
Moving beyond its compelling interest discussion, the dissenters shed light
on factors critical to their narrow tailoring analysis. For these Justices, a raceconscious plan is likely narrowly tailored if it is principally based on non-racial
factors with race as merely one component of the plan.397 The dissenting Justices,
unlike the plurality and Justice Kennedy, found JCPS and Seattle’s plans used race
only as a plus factor,398 as the principal factor in the plans was not race but rather
“student choice.”399
While the dissenters disapprove of strict quotas,400 they approve of tying
student assignments to racial demographics.401 Such an approach does not
constitute a quota if it only triggers use of race at the “outer bounds of broad
ranges.”402 Another way to describe the broad ranges is as “broad race-conscious

393

Id.

394

Id.

395

Id. at 840.

Id. at 841 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that these effects “foresee a time when
there is less need to use race-conscious criteria.” Id. See also id. (“this Court from Swann to Grutter
has treated these civic effects as an important virtue of racially diverse education.”).
396

397

Id. at 846. This is the “race-as-a-plus-factor” approach.

398

Id. at 846–47.

Id. See id. at 846 (“In fact, the defining feature of both plans is greater emphasis upon student
choice. In Seattle, for example, in more than 80% of all cases, that choice alone determines which
high schools Seattle’s ninth graders will attend. After ninth grade, students can decide voluntarily
to transfer to a preferred district high school (without any consideration of race-conscious criteria).
Choice, therefore, is the ‘predominant factor’ in these plans. Race is not.”) (emphasis added).
399

Id. See also id. (defining quota as “a program in which a certain fixed number or proportion
of opportunities are ‘reserved exclusively for certain minority groups.’” (quoting Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
400

Id. at 846–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also id. at 851 (“[T]his Court has in many
cases explicitly permitted districts to use target ratios based upon the district’s underlying population.
The reason is obvious: In Seattle, where the overall student population is 41% white, permitting
85% white enrollment at a single school would make it much more likely that other schools would
have very few white students, whereas in Jefferson County, with a 60% white enrollment, one
school with 85% white students would be less likely to skew enrollments elsewhere.”) (internal
citations omitted).
401

402

Id. at 846. See id. at 846–47 (citing cases allowing this pegging in support).
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student population ranges.”403 JCPS’s plan, for instance, triggered race only at
the outer bounds of broad ranges because the plan merely sought to increase
the black student population of its nonmagnet elementary schools to within the
15 and 50 percent range of the school population.404 This acceptance of broad
ranges is an element of the dissent’s “race-as-a-plus-factor” analysis;405 an element
not embraced in the plurality’s “race-as-a-plus-factor” analysis.406 Under the
dissent’s approach, race might sometimes only have a minimal effect “because
the racial makeup of the school falls within the broad range.”407 Yet, the plan
would be narrowly tailored.408 This is contrary to the majority’s “minimal-effect”
analysis which ruled that plans which only have a minimal effect are not narrowly tailored.409
Broad ranges are merely “useful starting points.”410 For example, in the case of
JCPS and Seattle, the dissenters pointed out that research based evidence shows
“that a ratio no greater than 50% minority—which is Louisville’s starting point,
and as close as feasible to Seattle’s starting point—is helpful in limiting the risk
of white flight.”411 Forcefully supporting the use of race-based ranges as starting
points, while evidently frustrated with the majority’s failure to approve using
racial demographics in assigning students, the dissenting Justices wrote:
What other numbers are the boards to use as a ‘starting point’?
Are they to spend days, weeks, or months seeking independently
to validate the use of ratios that this Court has repeatedly
authorized in prior cases? Are they to draw numbers out of
thin air? These districts have followed this Court’s holdings and

403

Id. at 862.

McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Schools, 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 842 (2004) (“the 2001 Plan
requires each school to seek a Black student enrollment of at least 15% and no more than 50%. This
reflects a broad range equally above and below Black student enrollment systemwide”).
404

405

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 846–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

406

See supra Part III.A.

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 846–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For the dissenting Justices,
other reasons that race might have a minimal effect include: “either because the particular school is
not oversubscribed in the year in question . . . , or because the student is a transfer applicant or has
a sibling at the school.” Id.
407

408

Id. at 846–47.

See supra Part III.A (discussing the majority’s “minimal-effect” principle). See also Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. at 733.
409

410

Id. at 847.

Id. at 851 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also id. (stating that “[f ]ederal law also
assumes that a similar target percentage will help avoid detrimental minority group isolation.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
411
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advice in ‘tailoring’ their plans. That, too, strongly supports the
lawfulness of their methods.412
Another key to narrow tailoring is a plan’s “manner” of development.413
“Manner” means that the plan must: (i) be “devised to overcome a history of
segregated public schools”;414 (ii) embody consultations with the community as
well as local experiences;415 (iii) be the outcome of a process designed to increase
student choice while reducing the necessity of such things as mandatory busing;416
and (iv) use race “diminish[ingly] compared to the use of race in preceding
integration plans.”417 Furthermore, the district must have tried other plans first;418
if there is a history of desegregation or use of race-conscious measures, they must
look at whether that history reveals that a plan less reliant on race would be
unsuccessful in achieving diversity.419
Under the majority’s narrow tailoring standard, no plan could ever comply
as the possible existence of such a plan is “purely imagined.”420 On behalf of the
412
Id. The dissenters also noted that plans with broad ranges like JCPS and Seattle’s are “less
burdensome, and hence more narrowly tailored” than the plan approved in Grutter. Id. at 847; id.
at 864 (“less burdensome, more egalitarian, and more effective than prior plans”).
413

Id. at 848.

414

Id.

415

Id.

416

Id.

417

Id. (“experimentation with numerous other plans”).

418

Id.

Id. at 848 (“[I]ndeed, the 40–year history that Part I sets forth [about JCPS and Seattle’s
history of desegregation and race-conscious plans], make clear that plans that are less explicitly racebased are unlikely to achieve the boards’ compelling objectives.”). The dissenting Justices explained
this “history” factor as follows:
419

The history of each school system reveals highly segregated schools, followed by
remedial plans that involved forced busing, followed by efforts to attract or retain
students through the use of plans that abandoned busing and replaced it with greater
student choice. Both cities once tried to achieve more integrated schools by relying
solely upon measures such as redrawn district boundaries, new school building
construction, and unrestricted voluntary transfers. In neither city did these prior
attempts prove sufficient to achieve the city’s integration goals.
Id. at 848.
Beyond the history of JCPS and Seattle, the dissenting Justices also considered history in general:
Nor could the school districts have accomplished their desired aims (e.g.,
avoiding forced busing, countering white flight, maintaining racial diversity) by other
means. Nothing in the extensive history of desegregation efforts over the past 50 years
gives the districts, or this Court, any reason to believe that another method is possible
to accomplish these goals.
Id. at 851–52.
Id. at 850. The dissenting Justices’ summarized the various factors critical to their narrowly
tailoring analysis as follows:
420
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dissenting Justices, Justice Breyer castigated the majority for its unrealistic and
impractical narrow tailoring standard. He indicated that his review of various
documents and court records spanning over fifty years of school desegregation
jurisprudence revealed several examples of districts using “explicitly race-conscious
methods” but not a single example that could satisfy the Court and plurality’s
opinions.421 In essence, Justice Breyer’s historical analysis revealed that the Court
and plurality’s standards effected coup de grace for race-conscious measures.
Beyond the legal analysis, the dissenting Justices made moral arguments
for favoring race-conscious measures. Appealing to the “moral vision”422 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Justices rejected the moral equivalency between use
of race to include people and the use of race to exclude people.423 They reasoned
that exclusionary segregation “perpetuated a caste system rooted in the institutions
of slavery and 80 years of legalized subordination.”424 Clearly perturbed by the
moral-equivalency arguments, Justice Breyer replied:
Indeed, it is a cruel distortion of history to compare Topeka,
Kansas, in the 1950’s to Louisville and Seattle in the modern
day—to equate the plight of Linda Brown (who was ordered
to attend a Jim Crow school) to the circumstances of Joshua
McDonald (whose request to transfer to a school closer to home
was initially declined). This is not to deny that there is a cost in
applying ‘a state-mandated racial label.’ But that cost does not
approach, in degree or in kind, the terrible harms of slavery, the
resulting caste system, and 80 years of legal racial segregation.425
Ultimately, the dissent concluded that the Court’s holding is a threat to
“present calm,”426 fuel for a “disruptive round of race-related litigation,”427 and
The upshot is that these plans’ specific features—(1) their limited and historically
diminishing use of race, (2) their strong reliance upon other non-race-conscious
elements, (3) their history and the manner in which the districts developed and
modified their approach, (4) the comparison with prior plans, and (5) the lack of
reasonably evident alternatives—together show that the districts plans are narrowly
tailored to achieve their compelling goals.
Id. at 855.
421

Id. (emphasis added).

422

Id. at 866.

423

Id. at 866–67.

424

Id. at 867.

425

Id. (internal citation omitted).

Id. at 803; id. at 866 (“today’s holding upsets settled expectations, creates legal uncertainty,
and threatens to produce considerable further litigation, aggravating race-related conflict”).
426

427
Id. at 803. See id. at 861 (“At a minimum, the plurality’s views would threaten a surge of
race-based litigation. Hundreds of state and federal statutes and regulations use racial classifications
for educational or other purposes. In many such instances, the contentious force of legal challenges
to these classifications, meritorious or not, would displace earlier calm.” (emphasis added) (internal
citation omitted)).
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a frustration to Brown’s promise of racially-integrated education.428 The majority
opinion makes race-conscious plans “often unlawful” while the plurality’s
(and particularly Justice Thomas’s) colorblind approach makes them “always
unlawful.”429 This gravely threatens the future of voluntary race-conscious
measures. It also makes Justice Kennedy’s embrace of K–12 racial diversity as a
compelling interest an illusory promise.

IV. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin
After Gratz, Grutter, and Parents Involved, K–12 schools and institutions of
higher education created race-conscious plans based on the confines established
in these precedential cases. One of those plans, created by the University of Texas
at Austin (UT), was challenged in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.430 Fisher
was the Supreme Court’s first review of a university’s race-conscious plan after
Gratz and Grutter.
Since the early 1990s, UT’s race-conscious admissions process has evolved
through various permutations.431 Until the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit found UT’s use of race unconstitutional in 1996, UT considered race,
along with the Academic Index (AI)—a numerical score representing an applicant’s
standardized test scores and high school academic performance—in its admission
decisions.432 After the ruling, UT changed from the race-conscious policy to a raceneutral admissions policy which examined an applicant’s Personal Achievement
Index (PAI) and the AI.433 The PAI involved a holistic evaluation of applicants’
potential contribution to the university based on the applicant’s background in
areas such as leadership, extracurricular activities, work, socioeconomic status, and
language spoken at home.434 The state legislature supported UT’s race-conscious
efforts by enacting the Top Ten Percent Law, automatically entitling students in
the top 10% of their high school class admission to a Texas higher education
institute.435 The United States Supreme Court stated that these initiatives, part of
an effort to increase minority student enrollment, lead to a more diverse student
body at UT.436
Id. at 803. The dissent surmised that progress on racial-integration efforts have “stalled.”
Id. at 805. See also id. at 863 (“I fear the consequences . . . for the law, for the schools, for the
democratic process, and for America’s efforts to create, out of its diversity, one Nation.”).
428

429

Id. at 861.

430

133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).

431

Id. at 2415; Hopwood v. Tex., 78 F.3d 932, 935–37 (1996).

432

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2415 (citing Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932, 955 (1996)).

433

Id. at 2415–16.

Id. The PAI also considered whether the applicant was from a single-parent household;
whether the applicant had lots of family responsibilities; participation in community service; and
“other special circumstances that give insight into a student’s background.” Id.
434

435

Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803 (West 2009).

436

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416.
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After the Court upheld a race-conscious policy in Grutter in 2003 and a study
released in 2004 found that UT did not have a critical mass of minority students
in its classes, UT crystallized its plans to return to a race-conscious policy.437
Under the new race-conscious policy, race was merely one plus-factor in a holistic
admissions-review process438 as race was added as a component of the PAI evaluation
without placing an explicit numerical value on it.439 Each college or major within
the university plotted a matrix as a graph for each scored application440 with the
PAI on the y-axis and the AI on the x-axis.441 Only applicants above a cutoff
line in the matrix were admitted.442 Under the policy, applicants identified their
race from five predetermined racial categories.443 While not dispositive, race was
a meaningful factor in evaluations.444 Race itself, while not impacting the PAI
score, helped provide context for the applicant’s achievements and determine his
or her “sense of cultural awareness.”445 Abigail Fisher—a Caucasian applicant—
challenged the policy after she was denied admission.446 The federal district court
granted UT summary judgment and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.447 The Fifth
Circuit reasoned that, under Grutter, courts had to grant substantial deference to
a university under the compelling interest prong as well as the narrow tailoring
prong of strict scrutiny.448 Abigail Fisher appealed to the Supreme Court.
Justice Kennedy wrote the 7–1 Supreme Court opinion.449 The fact that
Justice Kennedy—the swing vote in Parents Involved—wrote the Fisher opinion
after such a pivotal role in Parents Involved further amplifies his role in raceconscious cases moving forward. The lone dissenter Justice Ginsburg expressed
strong support for race-conscious measures.450 Justice Kagan recused herself
because, as solicitor general, she played a role in the United States’ amicus brief

437

Id. at 2416.

438

Id. at 2415.

Id.; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (W.D. Tex. 2009). The AI/
PAI system applied to top 10% applicants denied admission to their school of choice, non-Texas
residents (international and domestic) as well as non-top 10% Texas residents. Fischer, 645 F. Supp.
2d at 596.
439

440

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416 –17; Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 598.

441

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416; Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 598.

442

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416; Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 598.

443

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416.

444

Id. at 2416; Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 597–98.

445

Id. at 597.

446

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2415, 2417.

447

Id.

Id. at 2417; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 231–34, 249–53, 256–57, 259
(5th Cir. 2011).
448

449

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2414.

450

Id.
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in the Fifth Circuit arguing for UT’s race-conscious plan.451 Justice Thomas
wrote a concurring opinion—the longest opinion in the case—re-emphasizing
his opposition to race-conscious measures.452 Justice Scalia wrote a oneparagraph concurrence simply stating his belief that all racial discrimination
is unconstitutional, and suggesting he would have voted to overrule Grutter if
petitioner Abigail Fisher had asked the Court to do so.453 Scalia indicated he
joined the majority opinion only because he was not in a position to overrule
Grutter.454 The following sections discuss the majority opinion, Justice Thomas’
concurrence, and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.455

A. Justice Kennedy—the Voice of the Seven
In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote that the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals failed to require UT satisfy the “demanding burden” the Court imposed
on strict scrutiny in Grutter and in Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion.456 Under UT’s
first race-conscious policy, the university had 14.5% Hispanic and 4.1% African
Americans in its entering class, whereas under the following race-neutral policy,
UT’s entering class was 16.9% Hispanic and 4.5% African American.457 Justice
Kennedy subtlety (or not so subtlety) suggested that race-neutral alternatives to
UT’s goal of a diverse student body exist. He also subtly (or not so subtly) directed
the lower court, on remand, that UT’s policy is not narrowly tailored.
Justice Kennedy relied on precedent to support the belief that strict-scrutiny
jurisprudence, particularly narrow tailoring, must be very tough on raceconscious measures. For example, relying on Bakke, Kennedy recounted Justice
Powell’s emphasis that all racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny.458 He
pointed out that Justice Powell, in fact, insisted that the benign nature of a racebased plan is “irrelevant” in a plan’s strict-scrutiny review.459 Justice Powell, he
451
See, e.g., Hans A. von Spakovsky, Bench Memos: UT’s Missing Brief and Justice Kagan’s
Recusal, National Review Online (Oct. 27, 2011), http://nationalreview.com/bench-memos/
281465/uts-missing-brief-and-justice-kagan-s-recusal-hans-von-spakovsky.

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422–32. Justice Thomas’ longer opinion, running from page 2422 to
2432, is an indication of his passion against race-conscious measures. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent ran
from page 2432 to 2434. In comparison, Justice Scalia’ concurrence was a paragraph on page 2422.
The majority opinion ran from page 2415 to 2422.
452

453

Id. at 2422.

454

Id. at 2422–32.

455

See infra Part IV.A.

456

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2415.

457

Id. at 2416.

Id. at 2417. Justice Kennedy stated that, in Gratz and Grutter, the Court endorsed Justice
Powell’s precepts as governing precedent. Id. at 2418.
458

Id. at 2417; see also id. at 2421 (stating that “the mere recitation of a ‘benign’ or legitimate
purpose for a racial classification is entitled to little or no weight.” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989))).
459
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observed, iterated that government policies touching upon individual’s race must
be subjected to strict scrutiny.460 It is surprising that Justice Breyer, who disagreed
with applying strict scrutiny in the same way to benign and exclusionary uses of
race in his vigorous 65-page dissenting opinion in Parents Involved, signed on to
not only the opinion but this part of the opinion which contradicts his position
in Parents Involved.461
Justice Kennedy embraced Justice Powell’s recognition of diversity as a
compelling interest in Bakke.462 Under this view, the interest in the educational
benefits of diversity is compelling because diversity “serves values beyond race
alone, including enhanced classroom dialogue and the lessening of racial isolation
and stereotypes.”463 This view treats racial quotas in admissions as constitutionally
impermissible while plans that use race as a plus factor are permissible.464
Even though Justice Kennedy embraced Justice Powell’s view on diversity
as a compelling interest, he also took a stringent approach to strict scrutiny in
Fisher. Signaling the stringency of his strict-scrutiny approach in Fisher, Justice
Kennedy emphasized that Gratz and Grutter require a precise precondition for
diversity to constitute a compelling interest—diversity cannot be a compelling
interest unless the schools admissions process for diversity is “subject to
judicial review.”465 In such judicial review, the school has the burden of proof
to show the race-conscious policy passes the compelling interest prong by
specifying the reasons for the race-conscious plans and showing those reasons are
undoubtedly legitimate.466

460

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417.

See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 791, 803–868
(2007). In Parents Involved, Justice Breyer argued for a less stringent review for benign use of race;
yet, he signed on to Justice Kennedy’s opinion that the “analysis and level of scrutiny applied to
determine the validity of [a racial] classification do not vary simply because the objective appears
acceptable . . . . While the validity and importance of the objective may affect the outcome of the
analysis, the analysis itself does not change.” Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421 (citing Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 & n.9 (1982)).
461

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417–18. See also id. at 2418 (stating that “[n]othing in Justice
Powell’s opinion in Bakke signaled that a university may employ whatever means it desires to achieve
the stated goal of diversity without regard to the limits imposed by our strict scrutiny analysis.”
(emphasis added) (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 224, 275 (2003))).
462

463
Id. at 2417–18. Additionally, Justice Kennedy referenced the fact that Justice Powell’s
support for diversity as a compelling interest was also grounded in academic freedom under the
First Amendment. Id. at 2418.
464

Id. at 2418.

465

Id.

466

Id.
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Justice Kennedy identified five keys to narrow tailoring for a race-conscious
plan: the plan must (i) not be a quota;467 (ii) use race as merely a plus factor;468
(iii) be adequately flexible to allow for individualized holistic consideration;469
(iv) have a durational limit (i.e. a logical stopping point);470 and (v) be preceded
by a “good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.”471 Narrow
tailoring requires the means chosen to be “specifically and narrowly framed” to
achieve the compelling end.472
As in Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy ruled that racial quotas do not
constitute diversity for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, and that racial
balancing is not a compelling interest.473 Justice Breyer, one of the seven in Fisher,
clearly embraced racial balancing as a compelling interest in his dissenting opinion
in Parents Involved.474 Nonetheless, he surprisingly signed on to Justice Kennedy’s
opinion which condemned racial balancing. If Justice Breyer is backpedaling on
his strong stance for race-conscious measures in Parents Involved, that should
deeply trouble advocates of race-conscious measures as that would constitute
the loss of a major Supreme Court voice for race-conscious measures. Justice
Breyer might argue that Parents Involved dealt with K–12 education while Fisher
involved higher education. However, asserting such a distinction to justify joining
the majority opinion portions conflicting with his strong Parents Involved dissent
disingenuously exalts form over substance.
With respect to narrow tailoring, Justice Kennedy stated that quotas are
unacceptable.475 To be narrowly tailored, race-conscious plans must be flexible
enough to ensure individualized consideration of applicants.476 Narrowly tailored
plans do not make race the “defining feature” of applications.477 Narrow tailoring
requires race to be shown as “necessary . . . to the accomplishment of its purpose.”478
To support the ruling that race-conscious policies must be subjected to the “most
rigid”479 review, he cited precedents stating that classifications of people solely
467

Id. at 2420.

468

Id. at 2421.

469

Id. at 2420.

470

Id.

471

Id.

472

Id. at 2420.

473

Id. at 2419.

474

Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 838 (2007).

475

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418.

476

Id.

477

Id.

Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.)).
478

479

Id. at 2419 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)).
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based on race are “odious”480 and rarely constitute relevant grounds for disparate
treatment.481 Courts must instantly treat such policies as “inherently suspect”482
and conduct a “searching” review of race-conscious policies.483 Justice Kennedy’s
embrace of these strong words threatens the future of race-conscious measures as
it prevents an unfavorable disposition towards such measures.
Deference is another area of narrow tailoring that Justice Kennedy addressed.
In Grutter, the Court ruled that judges must defer to the educational judgments
of universities that diversity is essential to their mission.484 In Fisher, however, even
though Justice Kennedy acknowledged the need for deference, he interpreted the
deference due as only “some” incomplete deference.485 It is unclear what makes the
deference incomplete as he failed to provide a definition. He also failed to explain
his reasoning for departing from Grutter’s call for more complete deference. The
gray area that is incomplete deference only confuses school districts as they attempt
to comply with the dictates of Fisher. This uncertainty could cause districts to
refrain from pursuing any race-conscious measures rather than risk protracted
litigation or ultimately having their plans found constitutionally inadequate.
Justice Kennedy emphasized that, while courts could factor in university
expertise and experience, narrow tailoring decisions remain “at all times”
exclusively the judiciary’s purview.486 The judiciary must examine race-conscious
plans to ensure they are based on individualized evaluation of applicants rather
than using race as a dispositive factor.487 The Court added that “[n]arrow tailoring
also requires that the reviewing court verify that it is necessary for a university
to use race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity.”488 This verification

Id. at 2419 (citing Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
480

Id. at 2419 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (quoting
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533–534 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
481

Id. at 2419. See id. (“judicial review must begin from the position that any official action
that treats a person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 523 (Stewart, J., dissenting); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964))).
482

483

Id. at 2419.

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–29 (2003). The Grutter Court reasoned that
deference was important because of the expertise of the universities and the complexity of the plans,
often beyond the knowledge purview of courts. Id.
484

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419. He acknowledged the disagreement in Fisher between Justice
Scalia and Justice Ginsburg about Grutter’s consistency with Equal Protection Clause principles
after its finding of diversity as a compelling interest. However, he pointed out that the Fisher Court
had not been asked to re-examine the Grutter’s compelling-interest ruling. Id.
485

486

Id.

487

Id.

488

Id.
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entails a “careful”489 review to determine if race-neutral alternatives can be used to
achieve “sufficient diversity.”490 This statement is unsurprising, given that, earlier
in the opinion, Justice Kennedy upheld UT’s race-neutral program as fostering
greater diversity relative to UT’s first race-conscious policy:
The University’s revised admissions process, coupled with the
operation of the Top Ten Percent Law, resulted in a more racially
diverse environment at the University. Before the admissions
program at issue in this case, in the last year under the postHopwood AI/PAI system that did not consider race, the
entering class was 4.5% African–American and 16.9% Hispanic.
This is in contrast with the 1996 pre-Hopwood and Top Ten
Percent regime, when race was explicitly considered, and the
University’s entering freshman class was 4.1% African–American
and 14.5% Hispanic.491
Despite recognizing that narrow tailoring precedents do not require schools
to exhaust “every conceivable” race-neutral alternative,492 the Fisher majority
ruled that a “reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable raceneutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity.”493 The
Court stated that if a race-neutral alternative could promote the compelling end
“about as well and at tolerable administrative expense, then the university may not
consider race.”494 The notions expressed in these two statements are contradictory,
leaving schools with great uncertainty as to how to proceed. On one hand, schools
have leeway not to exhaust race-neutral alternatives; on the other hand, schools
cannot use race-conscious measures unless the court finds there is absolutely no
workable race-neutral alternative that could achieve the educational benefits of
diversity.495 Even if schools go to great lengths to exhaust race-neutral alternatives,
an opponent of a race-conscious plan could find or create a race-neutral plan,
leaving a reviewing court with no choice but to rule that the school’s race-conscious
plan is not narrowly tailored. After all, all that is required to constitute “workable
race-neutral alternative” is that the alternative have a “tolerable” administrative
cost and that it work “about as well” as a race-conscious plan. This is a very
minimal burden, if it even creates a burden in the first place.496

489

Id.

490

Id. at 2420.

491

Id. at 2416.

492

Id.

493

Id. at 2420 (emphasis added).

494

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

See id. at 2419–20 (discussing the judicial reins over school leeway that could effectively
undermine the school discretion to use race-conscious measures).
495

496

Id. at 2420.
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Justice Kennedy highlighted the lack of judicial deference under narrow
tailoring, noting that courts must “examine with care, and not defer to, a university’s
serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.”497 A
school’s good faith consideration is necessary but not enough.498 In other words,
schools must invest extensive time, expertise, and expense looking for race-neutral
alternatives with “tolerable” administrative costs that can achieve the compelling
end “about as well as” race-conscious plans if they intend to pass narrow
tailoring analysis. After all, schools bear the “ultimate burden of demonstrating,
before turning to racial classifications, that available, workable race-neutral
alternatives do not suffice.”499 In essence, the good faith consideration is not what
the school does in good faith but rather what the court thinks the school’s good
faith should have been.500 This certainly creates a lot of anxiety for schools because
it presents a losing gamble—the investment of extensive resources in search of
race-neutral resources by the school only to be told by a court that it should
have used a court identified race-neutral alternative. Effectively, a school’s good
faith consideration is never immune from a successful constitutional challenge.
For example, despite UT’s extensive efforts to create a constitutionally viable
race-conscious plan that was based on past precedent, the Court rejected the
Fifth Circuit’s deference to UT’s good faith consideration.501 In the wake of this

497
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 339–340 (2003)). See also id. at 2421 (“Strict scrutiny does not permit a court to accept
a school’s assertion that its admissions process uses race in a permissible way without a court giving
close analysis to the evidence of how the process works in practice.”).
498

Id. at 2420.

499

Id.

See, e.g., id. at 2420–21 (“Rather than perform this searching examination, however,
the Court of Appeals held petitioner could challenge only whether [the University’s] decision
to reintroduce race as a factor in admissions was made in good faith. And in considering such a
challenge, the court would presume the University acted in good faith and place on petitioner the
burden of rebutting that presumption. The Court of Appeals held that to second-guess the merits
of this aspect of the University’s decision was a task it was ill-equipped to perform and that it would
attempt only to ensure that [the University’s] decision to adopt a race-conscious admissions policy
followed from [a process of ] good faith consideration. The Court of Appeals thus concluded that
the narrow-tailoring inquiry—like the compelling-interest inquiry—is undertaken with a degree of
deference to the Universit[y]. Because the efforts of the University have been studied, serious, and of
high purpose, the Court of Appeals held that the use of race in the admissions program fell within
“a constitutionally protected zone of discretion. These expressions of the controlling standard are at
odds with Grutter’s command that all racial classifications imposed by government must be analyzed
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny . . . . Grutter did not hold that good faith would forgive
an impermissible consideration of race . . . . Strict scrutiny does not permit a court to accept a
school’s assertion that its admissions process uses race in a permissible way without a court giving
close analysis to the evidence of how the process works in practice.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)).
500

501
Id. at 2420–21. See also id. at 2421 (“The District Court and Court of Appeals confined
the strict scrutiny inquiry in too narrow a way by deferring to the University’s good faith in its use
of racial classifications and affirming the grant of summary judgment on that basis.”). Besides, the
Court ruled that good faith does not “forgive an impermissible consideration of race.” Id. at 2421.
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decision, schools will understandably shy away from implementing race-conscious
plans given the uncertainty and risks. This may, in fact, be precisely what the
Fisher majority indirectly aimed to achieve, given the contradictory statements we
highlighted earlier.
Justice Breyer’s withdrawal of support for deference to schools should be
unsettling for supporters of race-conscious measures. After all, in Parents Involved,
he strongly advocated for deference.502 For instance, he stated:
I do not claim to know how best to stop harmful discrimination;
how best to create a society that includes all Americans; how
best to overcome our serious problems of increasing de facto
segregation, troubled inner-city schooling, and poverty correlated
with race. But, as a judge, I do know that the Constitution does
not authorize judges to dictate solutions to these problems.
Rather, the Constitution creates a democratic political system
through which the people themselves must together find answers.
And it is for them to debate how best to educate the Nation’s
children and how best to administer America’s schools to achieve
that aim. The Court should leave them to their work. And it is
for them to decide, to quote the plurality’s slogan, whether the
best way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.503
Yet, just six years after this, he supported the Fisher majority opinion’s withdrawal
of deference to schools. Advocates of race-conscious measures must be very
demoralized to see a Justice, who took great pains to pen a 65-page opinion in
support of their views, sign on to the withdrawal of deference. Such a change
in tone and position from a previous supporter makes the future grim for raceconscious measures.

502
See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
803–868 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). For instance, in Parents Involved, Justice Breyer stated:

By way of contrast, I do not claim to know how best to stop harmful discrimination;
how best to create a society that includes all Americans; how best to overcome our
serious problems of increasing de facto segregation, troubled inner-city schooling, and
poverty correlated with race. But, as a judge, I do know that the Constitution does
not authorize judges to dictate solutions to these problems. Rather, the Constitution
creates a democratic political system through which the people themselves must
together find answers. And it is for them to debate how best to educate the Nation’s
children and how best to administer America’s schools to achieve that aim. The Court
should leave them to their work. And it is for them to decide, to quote the plurality’s
slogan, whether the best way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.
Id. at 862 (internal quotation marks omitted).
503

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803–868 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The Fisher majority’s coup de grace against race-conscious measures is
aptly captured in the court’s conclusion that strict scrutiny must not be “strict in
theory but feeble in fact.”504 In other words, strict scrutiny should be potent and
not feeble in its application. Essentially, the Court issued a nearly unanimous
directive to the lower courts to stringently apply strict scrutiny when race-conscious
measures are reviewed. It was for this same reason that the court remanded the
Fisher case back to the lower court.505 Unfortunately in Fisher, there was no
Justice Breyer to argue passionately for race-conscious measures. Instead, Justice
Thomas—one of the seven Justices in the majority—made the passionate case,
but it was against race-conscious measures, earning him our article’s appellation
“the forever lost vote.”

B. Justice Thomas—the Forever Lost Vote
According to Scott Grinsell, former Law Clerk for the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, “[a]mong the current members of the
Court, Justice Thomas is perhaps the strongest advocate of colorblindness.”506
In fact, Justice Thomas believes his view of colorblindness inspired the Brown
v. Board of Education litigation.507 Justice Thomas also believes that “advocates
of desegregation then redeemed the colorblindness principle . . . and gave it
expression in our law when the Court decided Brown and based the decision on
a colorblind reading of the Fourteenth Amendment.”508 Justice Thomas regularly opposes race-conscious measures, so Fisher was a logical platform to amplify
those views.509 Justice Thomas wrote his concurrence to underscore his belief
that race-conscious policies in higher education are “categorically prohibited by
the Equal Protection Clause.”510 Besides his colorblind view, this categoricalprohibition approach is another reason Justice Thomas is clearly a lost vote for
race-conscious measures.
Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion because the lower court did
not apply strict scrutiny, or at least not strict enough scrutiny.511 Justice Thomas
504

Id. at 2421.

505

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421–22.

Scott Grinsell, “The Prejudice Of Caste”: The Misreading Of Justice Harlan And The
Ascendency Of Anticlassification, 15 Mich. J. Race & L. 317, 331 (2010).
506

507

Id. at 331–37.

508

Id. at 337.

See generally Grinsell, supra note 506, at 331. For a great exposition on Justice Thomas’
colorblind approach, see Jonathan L. Entin, Justice Thomas, Race, And The Constitution Through
The Lens Of Booker T. Washington And W.E.B. Du Bois, 88 U. Det. Mercy L. REV. 755 (2011).
509

510

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422.

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 215, 231–32, 234 (5th Cir. 2011). See id. at
234 (“In short, the Court has not retreated from Grutter’s mode of analysis, one tailored to holistic
university admissions programs. Thus, we apply strict scrutiny to race-conscious admissions policies
in higher education.”).
511
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wanted the “strictest” scrutiny, or the “most exacting,” standard of review.512 This
is surprising, given his colorblind view and categorical-prohibition approach.
Thomas reasoned that the most stringent scrutiny is necessary because the
Equal Protection Clause sees people as individuals rather than members of racial
groups.513 Further, he portended that a “destructive impact on the individual and
our society” arises when people are classified by race.514 Race-conscious policies
need to be reviewed under an interpretation of strict scrutiny that “has proven
automatically fatal in almost every case.”515
Racial classifications can only be used where there is “pressing public
necessity.”516 This is Justice Thomas’ alternate way of characterizing compelling
interest.517 Previously, Supreme Court precedents only found public necessity for
racial classifications pressing when: (i) protecting national security,518 described as
the need to “provide a bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent violence,” 519 or at
the state or local level, “only a social emergency rising to the level of imminent
danger to life and limb;520 (ii) remedying past discrimination if there is “strong
basis in evidence” that the remedy is necessary and if the government entity was
responsible for the past discrimination;521 and (iii) the Grutter decision. While
acknowledging Grutter as a situation in which the Court found pressing public
necessity, Thomas dismissed Grutter as a true “pressing public necessity” case by
using the phrase “aside from Grutter,” and in stating that the Court acknowledged
“only two instances” of pressing public necessity.522 Additionally, Thomas called
Grutter a “radical departure” from precedents.523 Furthermore, Thomas believes
the first two interests listed above—interests he unequivocally supports as
compelling—should only apply in a “narrow set of circumstances.”524 Justice
Thomas criticized Grutter for recognizing the educational benefits flowing from
diversity as a compelling interest because the case did not involve national security

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422. One also has to wonder if he implied in his opinion that raceconscious policies constitute “racial antagonism.” Id.
512

513

Id.

514

Id. (citation omitted).

515

Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

516

Id.

517

Id. at 2423 & n.1.

518

Id. at 2423 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944)).

Id. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
519

520

Id. (citing Richmond v. J.A Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).

Id. (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 500, 504; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
277 (1842) (plurality opinion)).
521

522

Id.

523

Id.

524

Id.
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or a remedy of past discrimination.525 In fact, he concluded that, “[a]s should
be obvious, there is nothing ‘pressing’ or ‘necessary’ about obtaining whatever
educational benefits flow from racial diversity.”526 While acknowledging that the
Grutter Court deferred to the school in its compelling-interest analysis, Thomas
labeled such deference “[c]ontrary to the very meaning of strict scrutiny.”527
In his compelling-interest analysis, Justice Thomas distinguished the
“educational benefits derived from diversity” from diversity itself.528 Diversity as a
compelling interest is a “nonstarter” equivalent to racial balancing.529 “[D]iversity
can only be the means by which the University obtains educational benefits; it
cannot be an end pursued for its own sake.”530 Per contra, educational benefits
flowing from diversity are only “alleged”531 and “putative.”532 On one hand,
educational benefits flowing from diversity must “rise to the level of a compelling
state interest” to pass strict scrutiny muster.533 On the other hand, educational
benefits flowing from diversity “hardly qualify” as compelling.534
Not only did Justice Thomas oppose recognizing educational benefits
flowing from diversity as a compelling interest, he resisted expanding recognized
compelling interests beyond national security and remedying past discrimination.
Thomas reasoned that “the Court has frequently found other asserted interests
insufficient.”535 For example, the Court rejected “best interests of a child,”
“role models for minority students,” and remedying societal discrimination as
compelling interests.536

525

Id. at 2423–24.

526

Id. at 2424.

527

Id.

528

Id. at 2423.

529

Id. at 2424.

530

Id. (emphasis added).

Id. Also see the language “assuming they exist” in the following statement: “Unfortunately
for the University, the educational benefits flowing from student body diversity—assuming they
exist—hardly qualify as a compelling state interest.” Id.
531

532

Id. at 2426.

533

Id. at 2424.

534

Id.

535

Id. at 2423.

Id. His words were actually that the Court had “flatly rejected” as compelling the “best
interests of a child.” Id. He stated that the remedy of societal discrimination was not compelling
because it had “no logical stopping point.” Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 276 (1842)). As for role-modeling, he reasoned that the argument for role models for minority
students could result in the kind of segregation that existed before Brown: “the notion that black
students are better off with black teachers could lead to the very system the Court rejected in Brown
v. Board of Education.” Id. (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276).
536
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Justice Thomas carried forward his moral-equivalency view from Parents
Involved, noting that “just as the alleged educational benefits of segregation were
insufficient to justify racial discrimination then, the alleged educational benefits
of diversity cannot justify racial discrimination today.”537 Even if UT successfully
argued that it would be forced to close down due to a lack of diversity, the risk
of closure or actual closure is insufficient to sustain the race-conscious policy.538
Thomas compared such a closure to Virginia’s Prince Edward County’s closure
of public schools in resistance to desegregation after Brown.539 If closure of UT
could not justify a race-conscious policy, neither could the educational benefits of
diversity.540 Astonishingly, Thomas declared: “If the Court were actually applying
strict scrutiny, it would require Texas either to close the University or to stop
discriminating against applicants based on their race. The Court has put other
schools to that choice, and there is no reason to treat the University differently.”541
The “other schools” were segregated schools that resisted segregation with the
threat or actual closure of their schools.542
Justice Thomas further expounded on his moral-equivalency view in
responding to UT’s argument that diversity is critical to equipping students
for leadership in a diverse society.543 First, he called the race-conscious policy
“discriminatory,”544 and second, he noted that “segregationists likewise defended
segregation on the ground that it provided more leadership opportunities for
blacks.”545 In rejecting UT’s contention that diversity furthers interracial relations
and diminishes stereotyping, Justice Thomas declared: “In this argument, too,
the University repeats arguments once marshaled in support of segregation.”546
Additionally, Justice Thomas’ response to UT’s argument that the race-conscious
policy was a “temporary necessity” to address an “enduring” racial problem reveals
his failure to appreciate or at least acknowledge that segregation and race-conscious
measures are not equivalent.547 Specifically, Thomas responded that, “[y]et again,

Id. at 2424–25 (internal citation omitted). See also id. at 2426 (“It is also noteworthy that,
in our desegregation cases, we rejected arguments that are virtually identical to those advanced by
the University today.” (emphasis added)).
537

538

Id.

539

Id.

540

Id.

See id. (“If a State does not have a compelling interest in the existence of a university,
it certainly cannot have a compelling interest in the supposed benefits that might accrue to that
university from racial discrimination.”).
541

542

Id. at 2425–26.

543

Id. at 2426.

544

Id.

545

Id. (emphasis added).
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Id. at 2427.

547

Id.
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the University echoes the hollow justifications advanced by the segregationists.”548
Interestingly, he claims moral authority for these views in Brown.549
Moreover, Justice Thomas opined:
While the arguments advanced by the University in defense
of discrimination are the same as those advanced by the
segregationists, one obvious difference is that the segregationists
argued that it was segregation that was necessary to obtain the
alleged benefits, whereas the University argues that diversity is
the key. Today, the segregationists’ arguments would never be
given serious consideration. We should be equally hostile to
the University’s repackaged version of the same arguments in
support of its favored form of racial discrimination.550
In essence, Justice Thomas suggested that advocates of race-conscious policies
are neo-segregationists. Incredibly, he declared that “[t]here is no principled
distinction between the University’s assertion that diversity yields educational
benefits and the segregationists’ assertion that segregation yielded those same
benefits.”551 Justice Thomas revealed his disdain for race-conscious measures by
characterizing them as “faddish theories.”552
Such disdain led Justice Thomas to question UT’s motives for their raceconscious policy.553 Justice Thomas believed UT’s “use of race ha[d] little to
do with the alleged educational benefits of diversity.”554 He suggested UT’s
policy was an example of the “worst forms of racial discrimination” always put
forth to minorities with “straight-faced representations” about the benefits of
“discrimination.”555 “The University’s professed good intentions cannot excuse

548

Id.

549

Id. at 2427–29.

550

Id. at 2428 n.3 (internal citations omitted).

Id. at 2428. See also id. at 2429 (making the argument that the moral equivalency between
diversity and segregation is “neither new nor difficult to understand.”). Confoundingly, he made an
equivalency between Grutter and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)—the case that authorized
separate but equal laws. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2429 (“This simple, yet fundamental, truth was lost
on the Court in Plessy and Grutter.”).
551

552
Id. at 2428. He emphasized that he would reverse Grutter. Id. at 2429. He criticized the
Grutter Court for deferring to the Law School’s conclusion that diversity would produce educational
benefits. Id. at 2428. In his view, such benefits are a “far cry” from what he considers to be “truly”
compelling interests. Id. He stated that “no benefit in the eye of the beholder can justify racial
discrimination.” Id. at 2429.
553

Id.

554

Id.

555

Id. at 2429–30.
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its outright racial discrimination any more than such intentions justified the
now denounced arguments of slaveholders and segregationists.”556 Justice
Thomas opined that UT followed in the “inauspicious footsteps” of slaveholders
and segregationists by arguing for using benign racial discrimination to help
minorities.557 Further questioning UT’s motives, he declared that UT “would
have us believe [as segregationists and slaveholders did] that its discrimination is
likewise benign.”558 Thomas stated that using race is “never benign.”559
Justice Thomas also opposes race-conscious measures, believing they are
harmful to minorities. To support his contention, Thomas stated that in almost
all schools with race-conscious policies, “the majority of black students end up
in the lower quarter of their class.”560 Thomas questioned whether Hispanic and
black students admitted through the race-conscious policy could ever truly close
the “substantial” college achievement gap between their Asian and white peers.561
Without race-conscious policies, several non-competitive minorities would attend
universities where they would be “more evenly matched.”562 He argued that the
use of race-conscious policies is a disservice to those non-competitive minorities
in terms of their self-confidence and their learning as they are forced to attend
schools where they are not evenly matched.563 He relied on evidence showing
that students admitted under race-conscious policies are “more likely to abandon
their initial aspirations to become scientists and engineers than are students with
similar qualifications who attend less selective schools.”564 Thomas characterized
race-conscious policies as a mechanism for government to put citizens on
demeaning “race registers,” further diminishing the identity and self-confidence
of minorities.565 He concluded that UT’s policy “stamps” Hispanic and black
students with “a badge of inferiority” and “taints the accomplishments of all those
who are the same race as those admitted as a result of racial discrimination.”566
Thomas’ disdain for race-conscious policies is unsurprising, given the strong
non-interventionist perspective he expressed in Grutter:

556

Id. at 2430.

557

Id.

558

Id. at 2430.

Id. See also id. (stating that “it does not, for constitutional purposes, matter whether the
University’s racial discrimination is benign.”).
559

560

Id. (citing Stephen Cole & Elinor Barber, Increasing Faculty Diversity: The Occu
Choices Of High–Achieving Minority Students 124 (2003)).

pational
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Id. at 2431.

562

Id.

563

Id.
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Id. at 2432.
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Id. at 2422.
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Id. at 2432.
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Frederick Douglass, speaking to a group of abolitionists almost
140 years ago, delivered a message lost on today’s majority:
“In regard to the colored people, there is always more
that is benevolent, I perceive, than just, manifested
towards us. What I ask for the negro is not benevolence,
not pity, not sympathy, but simply justice. The American
people have always been anxious to know what they
shall do with us . . . . I have had but one answer from
the beginning. Do nothing with us! Your doing with
us has already played the mischief with us. Do nothing
with us! If the apples will not remain on the tree of their
own strength, if they are worm-eaten at the core, if they
are early ripe and disposed to fall, let them fall! . . . And
if the negro cannot stand on his own legs, let him fall
also. All I ask is, give him a chance to stand on his own
legs! Let him alone! . . . Your interference is doing him
positive injury.”
Like Douglass, I believe blacks can achieve in every
avenue of American life without the meddling of
university administrators.567
Justice Thomas’ non-interventionist perspective, moral-equivalency view, and
disdain for race-conscious measures cast him as the “forever lost vote” for advocates
of race-conscious measures.

C. Justice Ginsburg—I Stand Alone in Dissent
Justice Ginsburg bravely stood alone in the face of the coalition of seven
Justices and despite the loss of Justice Breyer—her ally in Parents Involved. She
opined that UT’s policy was not a quota but instead followed the Court’s decision
in Grutter and the Harvard Plan that Justice Powell endorsed in Bakke.568 Further,
Justice Ginsburg indicated that the Court must respect Grutter by deferring to a
university’s expertise and experience in its narrow tailoring analysis.569 Accordingly,
she argued that, pursuant to Grutter, the Court should have deferred to UT’s
extensive review, which concluded that “supposedly race-neutral initiatives” could

567
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349–50 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); accord Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2432 (averring that UT’s “racial tinkering harms the
very people it claims to be helping”) (internal citation omitted).
568
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2432–33. She also made it clear that she would not overrule Grutter
or Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion. Id. See supra note 94 (describing the Harvard plan).
569

Id.
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not achieve UT’s diversity goals.570 After all, UT’s policy “flexibly considers race
only as a factor of a factor of a factor of a factor in the calculus”571 and provides
for regular reviews, ensuring the plan has a logical stopping point.572 In fact,
Ginsburg insisted that remand was unnecessary since the court of appeals correctly
applied Grutter and Bakke in finding UT’s plan narrowly tailored.573 She declared
that the Fisher majority “rightly declines to cast off the equal protection frame
work settled in Grutter.”574 However, she appears mistaken in this assessment
since, as noted earlier,575 the Fisher majority did apparently jettison the deference
in Grutter’s framework.
Justice Ginsburg rejected Abigail Fisher’s argument that UT effectively
achieved its diversity goal through the Top Ten Percent Law and holistic
colorblind review of applications.576 She reasoned that such measures are not truly
“race unconscious.”577 Instead, they are plagued by “deliberate obfuscation”578
such “that only an ostrich could regard the supposedly neutral alternatives as race
unconscious.”579 Ginsburg made a humorous but biting criticism of Abigail’s
argument using Professor Thomas Reed Powell’s famous statement that “[i]f
you think that you can think about a thing inextricably attached to something
else without thinking of the thing which it is attached to, then you have a legal
mind.”580 Only such a legal mind “could conclude that an admissions plan
specifically designed to produce racial diversity is not race conscious.”581
Indeed, in Justice Ginsburg’s view, race-consciousness rather than
colorblindness motivated the Top Ten Percent Law and holistic review of
applications.582 Justice Ginsburg’s reasoning advances the argument that, if
applicants like Abigail Fisher have no problem with the Top Ten Percent Law and
holistic review of applications, they should similarly have no problem with other

Id. at 2434. She used the term “supposedly” because, as discussed below, she does not
believe that there is no pure race-neutral alternative that can have as its goal racial diversity.
570

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp.
2d 587, 608 (W.D. Tex. 2009)).
571

572

Id. at 2434.

573

Id.

574

Id.

575

See supra Part IV.A.

576

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2434.

577

Id. at 2433.

578

Id. (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 297–98 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting)).

579

Id. at 2433.

580

Id. at 2433 & n.2 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

581

Id.

Id. at 2433. See, e.g., id. at 2433 (“Texas’ percentage plan was adopted with racially seg
regated neighborhoods and schools front and center stage.”).
582
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race-conscious measures.583 This reasoning invites attacks on the Top Ten Percent
Law and holistic review of applications as unconstitutionally race-conscious.584
Alternatively, this reasoning could lead opponents of policies like UT’s to argue
that if the Top Ten Percent Law and holistic review of applications are raceconscious, then those measures should suffice without the need to adopt the kinds
of race-conscious policies UT and the schools in Parents Involved implemented.585
Justice Ginsburg warned that, “[a]s for holistic review, if universities cannot
explicitly include race as a factor, many may resort to camouflage to maintain
their minority enrollment.”586 She admonished the Court, however, to support
race-conscious measures encouraging schools to truthfully reveal their use of
race, rather than supposedly race-neutral measures that allow, and in fact inspire,
schools to use race stealthily.587 Ginsburg strongly believes schools should not
have to act with colorblindness in dealing with the enduring impact and “legacy”
of the nation’s discriminatory past.588
It appears that Justice Ginsburg is the lone voice on the Supreme Court
willing to advocate for race-conscious measures and push back against the coup
de grace infiltrating race-conscious cases. Since Justice Kagan did not participate
in the case, we cannot definitively predict how she would have ruled on UT’s
race-conscious policy.589 We do know that she recused herself because she was
the solicitor general when the United States filed an amicus brief supporting
UT’s policy.590 Therefore, if she had participated in the case, she likely would
have provided a second vote to support Justice Ginsburg. A coalition of only two
Justices, however, is insufficient to make a material difference in the outcome of
cases. The fact that Justice Kagan’s presence would have made the Fisher case a 7-2
decision is no less comforting than a 7-1 decision. Advocates of race-conscious
measures should be alarmed that what was a 5-4 opposition to race-conscious
measures through narrow tailoring in Parents Involved has now morphed into a
7-1 or even 7-2 opposition.

583

Id.

584

Id.

585

Id.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 304 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
586

587

Id. at 2433 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 305 & n.11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).

Id. at 2433 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 272–74 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
588

589

See Spakovsky, supra note 451.

590

Id.
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V. Implications
Even when the Court recognizes diversity as a compelling interest, several
roadblocks within the narrow tailoring analysis make it less likely race-conscious
plans will pass muster. A theme in various decisions discussed above is that the
record presented in court regarding the mechanics of race-conscious programs
must be clear. For example, the Gratz Court found the record inadequate and
the UM policy wanting because the record failed to show exactly how many
applications underwent ARC review.591 In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy’s
narrow tailoring analysis emphasized that schools must provide a detailed and
precise, rather than broad, description of their plans without inconsistencies,
discrepancies, or competing propositions.592 Despite these calls for clarity and
detail, schools are left wondering whether they can truly ever provide enough
clarity and detail to pass narrow tailoring. After all, the Court’s narrow tailoring
jurisprudence allows judicial second-guessing of the school’s expert determina
tions. Further, the Court’s narrow tailoring jurisprudence is obfuscated by
contradictory expectations for schools.593 Therefore, whether the Court will
ever be satisfied with any level of detail or clarity for race-conscious measures
remains unclear. Both Fisher and Parents Involved already bore this out as the
Court used the narrow tailoring prong to reverse lower court decisions upholding
schools’ race-conscious policies. Associate Law Professor and SCOTUSblog guest
contributor Melissa Hart recently explained the challenge schools now face as
they strive to meet the stringency of narrow tailoring:
Selecting a large diverse class of students is not akin to casting
individuals in specific roles in a play. Admissions officers face huge
numbers of applicants and great uncertainty about acceptances,
as a quick look at the UT numbers demonstrates. In 2008, UT
received 29,501 applications. The University accepted 12,843
students, and only 6,715 of those admits actually enrolled. This
enrollment reality—that you only net fifty percent of who you
admit—creates difficulties for a university that must explain
how its admissions policy, designed to achieve a wide range of
goals with a large number of applicants, is narrowly tailored to
those general goals.594
In other words, if a school admits 12,843 and only 6,715 accept their admission
offers, how can that school claim your policy is narrowly tailored when you did
not admit (because of race) people who would have attended? How can you
591

See supra Part II.B.

592

Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 784–85 (2007).

593

See supra Part III.A, IV.A.

Melissa Hart, Fisher Commentary: Everyone Wins, Everyone Loses, SCOTUSblog (June 25th,
2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/fisher-commentary-everyone-wins-everyone-loses/.
594
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claim your policy is narrowly tailored when half of those you admitted choose
not to attend? The uncertainty about whether the narrow tailoring prong of strict
scrutiny can truly be satisfied harrows race-conscious measures.
Amidst this legal uncertainty, “[m]any parents, white and black alike, want
their children to attend schools with children of different races.”595 In fact, the
“fate of race relations in this country depends upon unity among our children, for
unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will
ever learn to live together.”596 Furthermore, “the very school districts that once
spurned integration now strive for it.”597 Nonetheless, through narrow tailoring,
the Court has chosen to hogtie parents and districts willing to work together
toward racially-integrated educational settings.598 The ongoing narrow tailoring
coup de grace “obscures Brown’s clear message”599 of working toward educational
equity. Under the narrow tailoring prong, we might witness race-conscious plans
created with the “laudable purpose of achieving equal educational opportunities”
for minorities “founded on unsuspected shoals in the Fourteenth Amendment.”600
The hope of racially-integrated education that once fueled optimism is
rapidly becoming lost in the forlorn of strict scrutiny. In 1978, Justice Blackmun
declared: “I yield to no one in my earnest hope that the time will come when
an ‘affirmative action’ program is unnecessary and is, in truth, only a relic of
the past. I would hope that we could reach this stage within a decade at the
most.” 601 Almost three decades later, as the statistics show,602 affirmative action
remains necessary as schools remain divided along racial lines. Indeed, even in
1978, Justice Blackmun had an ominous feeling that his “earnest hope” was mere
idealism, noting his “hope is a slim one.”603
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Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 868 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

Id. at 864 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
596

597

Id. at 868 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

See id. at 868 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“they have asked us not to take from their hands the
instruments they have used to rid their schools of racial segregation, instruments that they believe
are needed to overcome the problems of cities divided by race and poverty. The plurality would
decline their modest request.” (emphasis added)).
598

599

Id. at 801 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Id. at 801–02 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Sch. Comm. of Boston v. Bd. of Educ., 227
N.E.2d 729, 733 (1967)).
600

Regents of the Univ. of Cali. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 403 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
601

602

See supra notes 1–23 and accompanying text.
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Bakke, 438 U.S. at 403.
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The reality of our history and heritage is that “a whole people were marked as
inferior by the law. And that mark has endured. The dream of America as the great
melting pot has not been realized for the Negro; because of his skin color he never
even made it into the pot.”604 Quality higher education and K–12 education
remain an elusive dream today for many minorities. The national reaction of
minorities to the George Zimmerman verdict as a betrayal of the justice system
and of America as the melting pot evidences the lingering feeling minorities
hold that they have not really made it into the pot in various institutions of
our society.605
The recent Supreme Court decisions on voluntary race-conscious measures
could make the hopes of equitable minority integration into the educational
melting pot a fantasy. In 2003, Justice O’Connor, writing for the Grutter
Court, expressed optimism that racial educational equality would soon become
entrenched in America and that race-conscious measures would be obsolete. She
stated: “We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”606 The time span
between Bakke to Gratz and Grutter was twenty five years.607 Educational inequity
has not substantially changed in twenty-five years.608 Despite Justice O’Connor’s
optimism, the judicial withdrawal of support for race-conscious measures could
actually make educational opportunities more inequitable for minorities over
the twenty-five years post-Grutter. After all, as Justice Breyer stated, “[p]ast
wrongs to the black race, wrongs committed by the State and in its name, are
a stubborn fact of history. And stubborn facts of history linger and persist.”609
The various roadblocks of narrow tailoring in Parents Involved and Fisher render
implementing race-conscious measures impossible. The narrow tailoring prong
thus becomes the untimely coup de grace for dreams of race-conscious measures
and genuine colorblindness. The very fact that, in an often-divided Court, seven
Supreme Court Justices coalesced in Fisher to set very stringent narrow tailoring
requirements is disconcerting, and should leave champions of race-conscious
measures despondent and upset. Nevertheless, these emotions must be channeled
to press on for the cause. The fight must continue for racial educational equity
through legislative and grassroots community-based initiatives designed to rally
604

Id. at 400– 01 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Gannon, supra note 368 (discussing the large racial divide in the reaction to the Zimmerman
acquittal and reporting that “reaction to the case looks far more lopsided when the survey participants’
race is considered. Blacks are dissatisfied with the verdict by a staggering 86-percent to 5-percent
margin, the poll found, and 78 percent say the case raises important questions about race.”).
605
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Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
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Id. at 322.

See Integration and Diversity, UCLA Civil Rights Project (Sept. 19, 2012), http://civil
rightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity.
608

Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 844–45 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
609

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2014

69

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 14 [2014], No. 2, Art. 10

774

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 14

public support. Until there is a different voice from the Supreme Court or a larger
coalition, advocates must work within the stringent framework the Court has laid
out. There is always the possibility a lower court might interpret the framework
less stringently than the Supreme Court intended. Since the Supreme Court does
not review education race-conscious cases on a perennial basis, race-conscious
measures might be able to sustain viability through the lower courts; at least until
the Supreme Court overturns the lower court. This is not the time to give up
Brown’s dream; this is not the time to abandon America’s children.

Conclusion
Schools around the country have voluntarily implemented race-conscious
measures in order to diversify their student bodies and provide the educational
benefits of diversity for students of all races. While these measures are founded on
noble intentions, they have been increasingly subjected to successful constitutional
challenges, particularly in the United States Supreme Court. In this Article, we
examined the strict scrutiny standard of review through the lenses of the United
States Supreme Court’s precedents on voluntary race-conscious measures at
the K–12 and higher education levels. We examined the Supreme Court’s analysis
of voluntary race-conscious measures in all five precedents—Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke ;610 Grutter v. Bollinger;611 Gratz v. Bollinger ;612
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 ;613 and
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.614
Our review revealed that, while various Supreme Court Justices have been
willing to embrace diversity as a compelling interest, they have made it burdensome
for schools to actually pursue that interest. Specifically, the Justices have made it
increasingly difficult to satisfy the narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny
test. This has created a coup de grace against voluntary race-conscious measures,
putting the future of voluntary race-conscious measures at great risk. The future
of those measures is also jeopardized because the coalition of Justices favoring
voluntary race-conscious measures continues to decrease. We hope this Article
would bring much needed attention to the stealth coup de grace that threatens the
future of race-conscious measures. While we celebrate diversity as a compelling
interest, we must keep perspective—narrow tailoring is quickly shutting the door
on race-conscious measures.
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